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Thi'TRODUcnON 
In 1999, The Economist cited to the critics of 
gambling activities and raised the spectre that 
'there might be a lot of money to be made by 
suing the' entities that knowingly get people ad-
dicted to gambling'.1 This observation paralleled 
the long-held conclusions among gambling addic-
tion experts such as the former executive director . 
of the Council on Compulsive Gambling of New 
Jersey, Arnie Wexler, who highlighted the con-
cerns of the gambling interests in 1997: 
'I think the industry is sitting on its hands ner-
vously looking· at what's happening to the 
cigarette industry', said Wexler, a frequent lecturer 
about compulsive [i.e., 'pathologicaI1 gambling. 
'The stuff that happened to the cigarette industry 
is going to happen 10-20 years down the road, if 
not sooner? 
As early as 1996, the Las Vegas gambling in-
dustry had a premonition of being saddled with 
mega-lawsuit problems similar to the tobacco in-
dustry, and had developed plans to counter the 
educational efforts of public interest groups,3 such 
as the National Coalition Against Legalized Gam-
bling (NCALG), an organization similar to Moth-
ers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). In 1996, in 
the heart of Las Vegas, the local paper opined a 
wake-up call to the gambling industry: 
Gambling and tobacco. Tobacco and gambling. 
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A leader in the national fight against the spread 
of legalized gambling is . .. attempting to link the 
tactics of both industries in their separate battles 
for public relations legitimacy. 
'It is out-and-out lying, and. .. [the gambling 
industry is] in denial', said Tom Grey [executive 
director of the NCALG].4 
By 1997, the strategies of anti-gambling groups 
combined with public interest groups were being 
readily detailed in the US press. 
Anti-gambling crusaders are borrowing a page 
from the anti-smoking movement., trying to tar 
casinos and lotteries with some of the same criti-
cisms leveled against the tobacco industry. 
The critics say legalized gambling, too, depends 
on addiction for profits, runs ads that glamorize 
its offerings and targets minors for future 
customers.5 
Similarly, it became apparent where the gambling 
industry was trying to focus the public's attention 
and frame the long-term strategic debate. 
Gambling proponents stress their industry has 
acted to keep itself out of the same dock as 
tobacco, by trying to identify its addicted clientele 
for treatment. 
Critics say those efforts are cosmetic, and that 
the $50-billion-a-year industry's profit margin de-
pends on compulsive [i.e., 'pathological'] gamblers 
lured by m~rketing strategies to exploit their 
addition.6 
This scenario was reminiscent of several public 
interest debates involving potentially harmful 
products-particularly tobacco. 
In this context the pro-gambling commissioners 
on the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission (1999 Gambling Commission) may 
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have voted for the 'smoking gun' of gambling 
liability. This occurred when to protect the big 
gambling companies' market shares, they joined 
with the entire Commission and voted unani-
mously to condemn and recommend a prohibition 
on 'convenience gambling'. Convenience gambling 
consists primarily of gambling in convenient loca-
tions via electronic gambling devices (EGDs), also 
known as video gambling machines (VGMs)-
which sociologists term the 'crack cocaine'7 of 
creating new addicted gamblers.8 Specifically, rec-
ommendation 3-6 of the 1999 Gambling Commis-
sion stated that: 
The Commission received testimony that conve-
nience gambling, such as electronic devices in 
neighborhood outlets, provides fewer economic 
benefits and creates potentially greater social costs 
by making gambling more available and accessi-
ble. Therefore, the Commission recommends that 
states should not authoriu any further conve-
nience gambling operations, and should cease and 
roll back existing operations.9 
In other words, if the pro-gambling commission-
ers recognized that EGDs/VGMs constituted dan-
gerous products for public use when located in 
convenience stores, a fortiori those EGDs/VGMs 
constituted dangerous products when crammed 
into casinos located anywhere.lo These concerns 
capped the developing debate of the 19908 regard-
ing the gambling industry and its promotion of 
gambling-oriented products and mechanisms-
particularly as these products and mechanisms 
paralleled the potential harmful effects charged to 
other well-known industries. 
Throughout the 20th century, the trend in the 
US was to hold corporations liable for the harm 
their products caused the general public. II A3-
bestos, lead, and particularly tobacco, were the 
leading products that raised liability issues.12 A3 
potentially harmful gambling activities were legal-
ized throughout the 19808 and 19908, a 1992 
Harris Poll indicated that the proliferation of 
legalized gambling failed to raise concern among 
a majority of the American public. '3 However, by 
the mid-I990s, the public's awareness, coupled 
with US Congressional concerns had increased, 
and eventually culminated in the 1996 National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission Act,14 which 
was enacted into law on 3 August 1996. This 
statute established the National Gambling Impact 
Study Commission, which charged nine commis-
sioners with producing a report within 2 years. IS 
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In this context, Tom Grey, the executive direc-
tor of the NCALG, planned to utilize the public 
meetings of the 1996-1999 Gambling Commis-
sion to voice the concerns of public interest 
groups. Grey wondered if 'gaming industry execu-
tives might commit political suicide and follow 
the lead of tobacco executives who reportedly lied 
to members of Congress during hearings on the 
effects of cigarette smoking'. 16 
This was not an unrealistic expectation, because 
the gambling industry appeared to be vulnerable 
to various types of mega-lawsuits, as well as Con-
gressional scrutiny. For example, Law Professor 
Dan Polsby of Northwestern University, pre-
dicted 'an upswing in class-action lawsuits, if 
lawyers score(d} big with tobacco' .17 Furthermore, 
Polsby indicated that there were 'a lot of indus-
tries that... [were] ri~ for tobacco-settlement 
kinds of detente', 18 including 'p]iquor, firearms, 
gambling'. 19 
Retreating into the unexpected posture of gam-
bling as an old 'vice' during the Gambling Com-
mission's hearings, by 1998, the Las Vegas 
gambling interests evidenced more defensive 
concerns. 
Of course, the alcohol and cholesterol pushers 
may have to wait for their tum in the crossbairs. 
Next up could be gambling. The . .. federal gam-
ing panel will inevitably lead to meddling in 
Nevada's primary industry, whether in the form of 
regulation, taxation or both'.20 
By focusing on regulation and taxation issues, 
however, the gambling industry was missing the 
real threat of mega-lawsuits initiated by the states. 
This analysis will compare the gambling indus-
try to the tobacco industry. It predicts that in the 
future the gambling industry will be held fman-
cially liable by the states for the social and eco-
nomic impact gambling has on US society. 
Furthermore, this analysis concludes that the 
gambling industry will be vulnerable to state-
initiated mega-lawsuits-even without specific 
costs being delimited either for individual 'patho-
logical gamblers' or for individual 'problem gam-
biers'. Thus, defmitional debates and academic 
debates regarding socio-economic costs may be 
largely irrelevant with regard to the states' mega-
lawsuits because the gambling industry's lobbyists 
at the American Gaming A3s0ciation (AGA) act-
ing on behalf of the gambling industry, and indi-
vidual gambling companies have acknowledged 
that the industry has created new pathological and 
problem gamblers during the 19908. 
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DEUMITAll0N OF PROBLEMS 
The Basic Economic and Legal Policy Rules 
Governing GambUng: The Problem of Public 
Misperceptions and Government Decision-Making 
Owing to the addicted gamblers, bankruptcies, 
and crime caused by gambling activities, all gam-
bling was criminalized throughout the US and 
much of the world during the latter half of the 
19th century. Consequently, decision-makers had 
no pressing need to be educated about gambling 
economics and the associated social issues. With 
the widespread legalization of various US gam-
bling activities in the 1980s and 1990s, and with 
the concomitant export of US gambling technol-
ogy to the international community, the educa-
tional need emerged to infonn the public, 
government decision-makers, and even the educa-
tional community. Furthennore, as the world's 
economic leader, the US government needed to 
establish its strategic economic base (which in-
cludes primarily the entire US economy along 
with its import-export components) as being ei-
ther primarily a nongambling economy or a 'gam-
bling economy'. 21 
Within the relevant regional market (tenned the 
'feeder market' by gambling companies), legalized 
gambling activities do not create net new ec0-
nomic development, or net new jobs because in-
creased demand for gambling is mirrored by 
decreased demand for other sectors of the relevant 
market. The illusion of net new economic devel-
opment and jobs occurs when gambling activities, 
such as new casinos,· are concentrated in a local 
market, but job losses within the 'relevant re-
gional market', or 'feeder market' are outside the 
local market. When the entire strategic economy 
is growing, the transfer of consumer dollars into 
gambling dollars is largely hidden. 
Economic MisperceptioDS According to Nobel 
Prize-winning economist Paul Samuelson,22 it is 
basic textbook economics that: 
[Gambling] involves simply sterile transfers of 
money or goods between individuals, creating no 
new money or goods. Although it creates DO out-
put, gambling does nevertheless absorb time and 
resources. When pursued beyond the limits of 
recreation, where the main purpose after all is to 
'kill' time, gambling subtracts from the national 
income.23 
Legalized gambling does provide recreation 
which is a service no different than a concert or a 
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play. However, from a political/economic view-
point, Professor Jack VanDer Slik has summa-
rized the basic principles emanating from 
reasoning equivalent to Samuelson's echoing in 
much of the academic community: '[State-spon-
sored gambling] produces no product, no new 
wealth, and so it makes no genuine contribution 
to economic development'. 24 
Sometimes government officials have difficulty 
differentiating between the various forms of gam-
bling that might become the subject of state law-
suits. Gambling industry economists have been 
criticized for taking advantage of uninitiated gov-
ernment officials by obfuscating the issues with 
analyses that switch between the various types of 
gambling. Generally, the various types of gam-
bling are irrelevant to government decision-
making when viewed in their proper strategic 
market.2s 
In gambling industry studies, the underlying 
focus is usually on: (1) how fast money can be 
extracted from the public, and (2) how effiCiently 
money can be extracted from the public.26 The 
techniques utilized to accomplish these goals usu-
ally consist of: (1) new, more and faster gambling 
technology, and (2) new and more sophisticated 
marketing.27 
The speed (and not the type) of the gambling is 
the proper focus.28 In a focused cost-benefit anal-
ysis, socio-economic costs, tax revenues, and 
other considerations should be calculated as a 
function of the degree of gambling (i.e., 'amounts 
lost' or 'gross revenues').29 In this context, lotter-
ies are generally considered the slowest type 
of gambling because the wagering historically 
occurred once per time period (such as once 
per year, or more modernly, once per week). 
Whereas, gambling via EGOs, particularly as they 
interface with the Internet, constitute the fastest 
forms of gambling. As the socio-economic nega-
tives associated with gambling activities are a 
correlated function of the amounts lost, the speed 
with which the money is lost (and not the type of 
gambling) is the proper focus. 
MisperceptiOl~ by the Public and the Press The 
US has long had a tradition of gambling,3O but 
since the end of the 19th century, the criminaliza-
tion of US gambling activities had relegated gam-
bling activities to a quasi-romanticized genre of 
friendly wagers, back alleys, and organized crime. 
With the trend toward legalizing gambling 
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activities at the end of the 20th century, the 
accessibility and acceptability of gambling began 
to 'hook' new gamblers. One conclusion of a 
1997 report by the Harvard Medical School was 
that the number of US citizens with 'severe gam-
1( bling disorders' increased by 55%31 since the ad-~ vent of Atlantic City gambling in 1977. In 
addition, 'the number of 'problem' gamblers-
those who have lied, cheated, stolen, or suffered 
anxiety attacks as a result of gambling-
[had] ... climbed from 4% of the adult popula-
tion to 71'10',32 However, the pathological and 
problem. gambling were not only confined to the 
adult population. Approximately 1.1 million ado-
lescents from the age range from 12 to 18 were 
identifted as pathological gamblers.33 In addition, 
in states such as Louisiana, it was reported that 
one in seven 18-21 year olds had a chronic 
gambling problem.34 
MisJeadIag Studies 8IId PR y""' ........ by the 
Gambling Indastry 
Another strategy common to both the tobacco 
and gambling industries appears to be their ten-
dency to be connected to any research project 
conducted on their respective products, Those 
familiar with the topics typically agree that it is 
difficult to find objective research regarding the 
impact of legalized gambling on communities.3s 
In fact, '[m]uch of the research that has been 
used in government decision making was pre-
pared by researchers with close ties to the gam-
bling industry'. 36 
'There isn't one piece of research the industry has 
funded on the social costs of problem gambling 
that is ac:ademit;ally respectable. It's all self-serv-
ing', says scholar Hemry Lesieur of the Institute 
for Problem Gambling in Connecticut. 'It says a 
lot about the nature of the field that research 
funded by the industry is going to dominate the 
dialog for the next few years. That is a sad state'. 37 
A few government officials have recognized this 
and have expressed their frustration. The chief 
executive of the Illinois Gaming Board during 
the 19908, Mike B. Belletire, noted, in reference 
to proposed riverboat gambling on the Missis-
sippi River, 'Frankly, the analyses that were done 
were paid for largely by or on behalf of those 
who are proponents of this project ... There is 
not a good reference base for me to understand 
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the economic effect of gaming either in the broad 
economy or the derived revenue to the state'.38 As 
the Illinois administration changed in 1998, Belle-
tire went from gambling regulator to the position 
of chief operating officer of special events at the 
National Jockey Oub, Sportsman's Park race-
track-illustrating the problem. of the 'revolving 
door' for government regulators being hired to 
become gambling industry advocates, and the 
need for enactment of the 1999 Gambling Com-
mission's recommended I-year ban between being 
a regulator and working for the gambling indus-
try.39 
The 19908 also witnessed similar attempts by 
the gambling industry to obfuscate public under-
standing which was bemoaned by the national 
press: 
fI1he industry saw opportunity in the narrow and 
poorly funded area of compulsive gambling re-
search. Through lucrative grants, it has developed 
its own body of data and undermined studies 
critical of the industry, triggering a wave of white 
papers.40 
In an accurate summary of a frequent gambling 
industry tactic, Commissioner Richard Leone, of 
the National Gambling Impact Study Commis-
sion, summarized that if the gambling industry 
can 'keep the focus of the camera tight 
enough, .. , [it] can show gains [from gam-
bling)',41 however, he indicated that the view 
would change as the camera zoomed out>42 and 
the socio-economic negatives would become 
apparent. 
Unlike most other studied public issue areas, 
gambling industry executives have targeted the 
academic community for harsh criticisms; for 
example, 
William Thompson of the University of Nevada at 
Las Vegas says he has feh the weight [of the 
gambling industry]. On several occasions after he 
releaaed studies on gambling's social impact, 
Thompson says, he picked up the phone only to 
hear Mirage CEO steve W}'DJ1 ICl'ea1ning 
profanities. 
Wynn's spokesman, Alan Feldman, says 
Thompson had it coming: 'Some of Mr. Thomp-
son's theories are deserving of that kind of reac-
tion because they're so off the waII'.43 
Compared with the tobacco industry, these in-
stances from gambling industry scenarios may be 
less tactfully executed, but the strategies appear 
to be quite similar.44 
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By comparison, tobacco companies were one of 
the largest sources of private funding for biomed-
ical research4s by the mid-l990s. The 1998 British 
Medical JOUT1IIlI revealed a global campaign by 
the tobacco industry to mold public opinion on 
passive smoking in Europe, the Far East, the 
Pacific-Rim (e.g., Australia), and Central and 
South America.46 The Philip Morris Company 
reportedly 'setup a network of scientists through-
out Europe who were paid to cast doubt on the 
risks of passive smoking and highlight other pos-
sible causes of respiratory problems'.47 Further-
more, it was reported that industry 'documents 
clearly show the industry inventing and orches-
trating controversies by buying up scientists and 
creating influential outlets for tainted science'.48 
One organization formed in 1953 and later known 
as the Council for Tobacco Research arguably 
had the purpose of 'sponsor[ing] a public rela-
tions campaign which [was] ... entirely 'pro-
cigarettes'.49 The National Center for Responsible 
Gaming (NCRO), which was formed and fi-
nanced primarily by gambling interests as a non-
profit organization, has been similarly criticized 
by the national media. so 
It was also revealed that the tobacco industry 
apparently 'paid people to write articles favorable 
toward cigarettes and unfavorable toward public 
health research, and paid them even more when 
national magazines published their articles'. 51 
Academia complained that this type of behavior 
was all too common among corporations involved 
in the production of a product that is harmful to 
society.52 The web of 'secrecy, deception, and 
propaganda' was supPosedly woven for the mere 
sake of profits. 53 The US national press has re-
vealed similar tactics by the gambling industry. 54 
CLARIFICATION OF GOALS 
The overall goal of all government authorities is 
well-recognized in common law and customary 
international law as the maintenance of a favor-
able legal order. Regarding public issue areas, 
government officials are charged with promoting 
the 'public health, safety, and welfare'. In the 
context of a product or mechanism that is poten-
tially harmful to the public, government entities 
are ethically charged with at least determining the 
costjbenefits to society. As indicated during Con-
gressional hearings in 1994 before the US House 
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of Representatives Committee on Small Business, 
this government shibboleth can be simply 
illustrated.5s 
The essence of the gambling debate from an ec0-
nomic perspective can be understood by asking 
the question: Does America need another form of 
entertainment so badly that it is willing to add 
another social problem to the list that it already 
deals with such as crime, alcoholism, teen preg-
nancy, illegal drug use and so on~ 
Purely from a cost/benefit perspective, the issue 
of legalizing gambling activities should be easy for 
government authorities to visualize. 
From the Federal Government's perspective, a 
good analogy might be the following. Imagine if a 
pharmaceutical company invents a new pharma-
ceutical. There are already other drugs available 
for the same purpose. The product works ex-
tremely wen for 98.5«'10 of the people who use it. 
However, for 1.5% of the people who use it, the 
drug completely ruins their life. Would the FDA 
license this dru~ 
In this context, it was unfortunate that state 
governments across the US did not do their 
homework before legalizing various form of gam-
bling during the 19808 and 19908. In spasms of 
neglect, no comprehensive reports were commis-
sioned or conducted by the various states-with 
the notable exception of Florida during 1994.58 
Interestingly, Florida government officials and the 
public rejected legalized casino gambling in 1994 
after Florida did its reports. 
Another primary goal of the states and the US 
government should be to educate the public with 
regard to the negative consequences which can 
occur from legalized gambling activities; specifi-
cally, (1) new addicted gamblers, (2) new 
bankruptcies in the 35-mile feeder markets around 
concentrated gambling activities, such as casinos, 
and (3) new crime and corruption, particularly in 
the 3S-mile feeder markets. 
Governmental entities should also cease from 
deceiving the public with regard to educational 
funding tied to legalize gambling activities. As any 
grade school library can attest by a quick refer-
ence to the 1994 World Book Encyclopedia Up-
date, 59 state funding to education has not 
benefited from the revenues generated by legalized 
gambling activities.60 In fact, the definitive study 
conducted by Money Magazine'1 in 1996 proved 
that in those states with legalized gambling 
activities, educational funding in real dollars was 
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substantially less than in those states which were 
either without legalized gambling activities or 
which had not tied education funding to legalized 
gambling revenues.62 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
An Overview of US Legalized Gambling 
Legalized gambling began to gain public accept-
ability particularly after World War II when Ne-
vada became the ftrst state to authorize large-scale 
legalized casino gambling.63 By 1999, legalized 
gambling in various forms was permitted in 47 
states and the District of Columbia, 64 approach-
ing $55 billion in gross revenues. As a percentage 
of personal income, gambling wagers more than 
doubled between 1974 and 1997.65 In 1976, US 
citizens legally wagered $17.3 billion, but by 1997, 
the amount wagered was $639 billion.66 By the 
1990s, the US legalized gambling industry netted 
more proftt than the combined totals of all US 
theme parks, cruise lines, the video game industry, 
the music industry, the movie industry, and pro-
fessional and amateur sports.67 In fact, the $600 
billion that Americans legally wagered each year 
was, according to National Commissioner James 
Dobson of the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commission, more than the $450 billion Ameri-
cans spent each year on groceries.68 It was no 
surprise to the experts that the number of Gam-
blers Anonymous (GA) chapters doubled between 
1990 and 1999.69 Furthermore, a Harvard study 
underwritten by the gambling industry itself re-
vealed that between 1994 and 1997 the increase in 
the number of US pathological gamblers was 
between 1.5 million and 2.2 million,70 which par-
alleled the spread of US legalized gambling-par-
ticularly, casino gambling. 
'Opportunity theory proposes that, if opportu-
nities are offered, people take advantage of 
them'.71 In the area of gambling, this principle is 
termed the accessibility principle; that is, as gam-
bling opportunities are made more accessible to 
people, more people will gamble. Whether gam-
bling per se constitutes an 'opportunity' in an 
economic sense is irrelevant; what is relevant is 
the ease of the public's accessibility to the gam-
bling venue. 
In any event, the 19908 recognized legalized 
gambling as one of the fastest growing pastimes in 
the US.72 Between 1982 and 1990, for example, 
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what Americans spent on legal gambling activities 
'grew at almost twice the rate of income'.73 Dur-
ing the same time frame, the gambling industry 
experienced growth rates approximately 2.5 times 
that of the manufacturing industries.74 The expan-
sion of the US gambling industry occurred pri-
marily during the 1980s and early 1990s.75 'The 
legalization of slot machines in remote Montana 
locations (1985), passage of federal legislation for 
tribal-run gambling (1988), the legalization of 
Iowa casino riverboats (1991), and the introduc-
tion of electronic keno gambling in Oregon (1991) 
all encouraged the gambling industry in its expan-
sion efforts'.76 By 1999, there were 37 states (Plus 
Washington, DC) with lotteries, and 28 states 
with casinos.77 
The growth of legalized gambling followed pre-
dictable sales pitches.78 To gain entry into new 
jurisdictions, the gambling industry alleged that: 
(1) casinos and casino riverboats would appeal to 
tourists and provide 'family entertainment', (2) 
gambling would create new jobs, (3) gambling 
would generate a positive multiplier effect within 
the local economy,79 and (4) gambling revenues 
could be earmarked to support one of the 'Big 
Es' -education, the environment, the elderly, new 
employment and/or economic development. 80 
However, the rapid expansion of legalized gam-
bling did not occur without substantial socio-
economic costs.81 The 'accessibility' of gambling 
can result in a portion of the public becoming new 
addicted gamblers with resultant social disorders, 
medical costs/conditions, and substantial private 
and public costs.B2 'Pathological gamblers tend to 
engage in forgery, theft, embezzlement, drug deal-
ing, and property crimes to payoff gambling 
debts'.83 In the study conducted by the University 
of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center 
(NORC), a 'low-ball number' of each pathologi-
cal gambler's costs to society totaled approxi-
mately $12000 in lost beneftts and the costs of 
policing during their lifetime. B4 With respect to 
gambling, Professor David Lester demonstrated 
that those states permitting 'gambling at casinos, 
sports betting, jai alai, and teletheaters had a 
greater per capita number of GA chapters'. 85 GA 
is an international organization which treats 
pathological (addicted) gamblers via a 12-step 
program similar to that used by Alcoholics 
Anonymous.86 
Owing to the ftnancial, marital, occupational, 
and legal problems endemic to pathological 
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gamblers and their families, pathological gamblers 
experience the following disorders at levels above 
the general population: depression, insomnia, mi-
graines, intestinal disorders, anxiety attacks, high 
blood pressure, cardiac problems, and other 
stress-related medical conditions.87 In addition to 
various medical conditions, pathological gamblers 
evidence social disorders such as anti-social per-
sonality disorder and narcissistic personality dis-
orders.88 Without attempting to quantify the 
unique value of every human life, it should be 
noted that between 12 and 18% of those in GA 
have attempted suicide, 45-49'110 have planned to 
commit suicide, 48-70% have contemplated sui-
cide; and 80% have evidenced a death wish and 
stated that they 'wanted to die'.89 Similar to drug 
addiction, many pathological gamblers who have 
attempted to quit gambling have been largely 
unsuccessful.90 'In a study of 232 attendees of GA 
meetings, Stewart and Brown (1988) found that 
total abstinence from gambling was maintained 
by only 8 percent one year after their first atten-
dance, and by 7 percent at two years'.9l 
Productive fJis-a·flis Unproductive Avenues of 
Liability: 1be Strategic Historical Overview 
An analysis of case law can differentiate between 
what have been unproductive vis-a-vis productive 
avenues for bringing causes of action against the 
tobacco industry,92 and then lead to parallels be-
tween causes of action involving the tobacco in-
dustry and the gambling industry. In this context, 
causes of action brought by governments to re-
cover the Medicaid and Medicare types of costs93 
associated with tobacco-related illnesses appeared 
to be the most successful. Second, causes of action 
brought on the basis of the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)94 appeared 
to be headed for successful results in the 21st 
century. By modeling causes of action against the 
gambling industry on cases involving the tobacco 
industry, governments and private litigants had 
the potential to bring multi-billion-dollar cases 
against various segments of the gambling 
industry. 
Only limited historical references will be men-
tioned herein involving some of the classic to-
bacco cases involving the traditional causes of 
action against the tobacco industry. This ap-
proach was utilized, because the classic cases since 
the 1950s were largely unsuccessful owing to the 
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theories under which they were brought. These 
cases tended to become mired in issues involving 
negligence and product liability as they interfaced 
with the defenses of contributory negligence, as-
sumption of the risk, and/or a lack of 'cause-in-
fact'. 
This analysis does not consider in-depth the 
parallel cases in issue areas other than gambling, 
such as cases involving gun manufacturers,9s be-
cause these issue areas are beyond the scope of 
this analysis. It should be noted, however, that 
from a government-policy perspective the mere 
threat of tobacco types of cases against industries, 
such as the firearms industry,96 have resulted in 
major policy changes within the industry itself.97 
The Legal History of the Tobacco Cases 
The first two waves of tobacco litigation occurred 
during the 1950s and the 1980s, respectively, but 
these litigations were unsuccessful because they 
were predicated in tort law98 primarily under 
theories of negligence, deceit, and breach of ex-
press and implied warranties. The second wave 
also added the litigation theories of strict liability 
(e.g., product liability) and failure to warn. Suc-
cess for plaintiffs, however, was found in the 
1990s in initiatives that centered on a public 
health approach.99 
One of the frrst significant cases which involved 
trying to hold tobacco companies . liable for the 
injuries caused by smoking was Gree':' v~rican 
Tobacco Co. lOll decided during the late 1960s. The 
Green case capped a trend of over 100 unsuccess-
ful cases initiated . during the 1950s against to-
bacco companies.101 The Green case initially held 
that smokers were entitled to rely on the compa-
ny's implied assurances that cigarettes were fit for 
the manufacturer's intended purpose of being 
smoked by consumers.102 Furthermore, a con-
sumer's death from smoking cigarettes rendered 
the tobacco company 'absolutely liable'. 103 How-
ever, in 1969 the US Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals overruled en bane its own earlier decision, 
and held that cigarettes were not 'defective' per 
se.104 
The next classic case was Cipollone v Liggett 
Group, Inc.,los which was ftled in 1983 on behalf 
of Rose Cipollone against three large cigarette 
manufacturers. The convoluted Cipollone case was 
twicelO6 before the US Supreme Court, and the 
Court basically held that causes of action against 
Manage. Decis. Econ. 22: 17-63 (2001) 
24 l.W. KINDT 
cigarette companies, which were based on a fail-
ure to warn consumers of the dangers of cigarette 
smoking, were preempted by the federal laws reg-
ulating warnings by tobacco product manufactur-
ers.107 However. the net impact of the US 
Supreme Court's second decision resulted in an 
·apparent victory for the Cipollones,l08 because the 
Court ruled that the federal acts did not preempt 
numerous potential causes of action.109 Even so, 
the Cipollones' attorneys voluntarily dismissed 
the case. 110 
Apparently exhausting the Cipollones' attor-
neys with $5-6 million in legal costs,111 the to-
bacco companies 'had adopted the theory of 
General Patton that rather than spending their 
own assets, they would force the plaintiffs to 
spend all of their assets'. 112 By comparison, the 
Liggett Group reportedly spent more than $75 
million.1l3 By the mid-199Os, the Cipollone family 
had dropped all of their legal efforts.U4 
After the Cipollone cases, the next significant 
case was a 1994 Louisiana class action suit, Cas-
tano v American Tobacco Co. us The 'rifle shot' 
pleading in Castano was a fraud claim against the 
tobacco companies which alleged that, while 
knowing the dangers of tobacco use by con-
sumers, the cigarette/tobacco manufacturers had 
failed to warn consumers that tobacco use was 
addictive and that tobacco smoke was injurious to 
smokers (and other people as well).116 The 'shot-
gun' claims against the tobacco companies in-
cluded not only 'fraud and deceit', but also 
'negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, violation of consumer pro-
tection statutes, breach of express warranty, 
breach of implied warranty, negligence, strict li-
ability, redhibition [avoidance of purchase due to 
defective product], and equitable rellerY7 The 
court highlighted the deceit-addiction nexus by 
stating that the claims of the plaintiffs were pred-
icated 'on their contention that [the] defendants 
intentionally failed to disclose, and in fact con-
cealed, knowledge that nicotine is addictive and 
that [the] defendants manipulate nicotine levels in 
their cigarettes for the purpose of addicting con-
sumers to their products and sustaining that 
addiction'. 111 
Thus, this third wave of tobacco litigation was 
predicated largely upon claims that the tobacco 
industry 'knew, but long hid, their knowledge that 
nicotine is pharmacologically active and highly 
addictive; and. .. manipulated nicotine levels in 
Copyright C 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
their products to hook unsuspecting smokers'. 119 
There are obvious parallels between these deceit-
addiction arguments involving the tobacco indus-
try and similar arguments against the gambling 
industry involving the addictive nature of VOMs 
which constitute 70-80% of casino revenues. 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately 
decided that the Castano class action complaint 
should be dismissed. l20 The demise of the 'federal' 
class-action theory in this tobacco case opened the 
door for 'statewide' class-action suits in the indi-
vidual states,and beginning in 1996, many such 
lawsuits were med.121 
The most notable of these class-action cases 
was a Florida class-action case RJ. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. et al. v Engle.l22 On 14 July 2000, the 
jury found for the plaintiff smokers and ordered 
America's five largest tobacco companies to pay 
$145 billion in punitive damages.l23 The plaintiffs 
had asked jurors for an award of $196.8 billion, 
alleging that this amount was necessary to recom-
pense for 50 years of misconduct and injuries by 
the tobacco companies to 700000 Florida smok-
ers.l24 The verdict assessed penalties of $145 bil-
lion, including $73.96 billion to Phillip Morris, 
$36.28 billion to R.J. Reynolds, $17.59 billion to 
Brown & Williamson, $16.25 million to Lorillard, 
and $790 million to Vector Group (the owners of 
Liggett).I2S This verdict was by far the largest 
damage award ever in US history, and dwarfed 
the former record punitive damages award of $5 
billion against Exxon in the Exxon Valdez oil-
spill. l26 If the penalty ever actually has to be paid, 
it would bankrupt the industry .127 The tobacco 
industry condemned the Engle decision and 
vowed to use every means at its disposal to undo 
the award. l28 Pro forma, the tobacco companies 
claimed the judgment should be overturned or 
mitigated because legal errors were made during 
the trial. l29 The tobacco industry also med a 
notice of removal of the case, which would actu-
ally transfer the entire case to federal court. 130 
There are obvious parallels between statewide 
class-action cases against tobacco and potential 
cases against the gambling industry. For example, 
in December 1997, the New York Times summa-
rized '[c]asino industry executives, who have 
proven ingenious at marketing their products as 
harmless adult entertainment, until recently had 
been loath to concede that some gamblers became 
addicted'. 131 While apologists for the gambling 
indUStry,132 such as William Eadington,133 have 
Manage. Decis. Econ. 22: 17-63 (2001) 
(") 
~ 
i 
..... 
@ 
8 
-~ 
~ 
~ 
R<> 
til § 
!" 
~ 
f ~ 
~ 
~. 
~ ~ 
~ 
--...J 
I 
0\ 
W 
~ 
..... 
....., 
;:~;"'jj b1 
pr,",l;,~t:ff~ ~~blev"" ~ 
Table 1. Percentage of Expenditures by Problem Gamblers for Selected Forms of Gambling by State/Promces 
Alberta British Columbia Nova Scotia Washington Louisiana Iowa 
Bingo ("10) 43.6 37.3 N/A 44.6 N/A N/A 
Lotto (%) 11.3 lotto; 19.3 11.9 lotto; 14.3 scratch 6.2 lotto; 22.7 24.2 daily game 17.6 all lotto 24.4 instant 
instant scratch games 
Caltino (%) 37.2 local; 34.4 26.7 resort; 33.1 table 48.7 55.0 card/dice N/A 38.4 table 
card/dice 
Slots (%) 19.0 N/A 8.9 N/A N/A 16.1 
Video machine (%) 46.9 N/A 50.8 23.9 37.8 N/A 
All games (%) 32.3 22.6 26.4 24.7 41.2 26.8 
Horses ("/0) 54.2 on and off 29.5 on-track N/A 25.9 52.7 on-track; 48.4 
track 84.9 off-track 
Sports (%) 19.0 friends/ 2 I. 7 sports; 19.7 friends; N/A 18.9 pools; 82.7 62.6 43.9 
co-workers 15.2 pools bookies 
PuIl tabs (%) 45.1 20.9 N/A 35.2 N/A NJA 
Rames (%) 10.5 11.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
All ("/0) 32.3 22.6 26.4 24.7 41.2 26.8 
New York 
39.5 
21.9 lotto; 36 
quick draw 
41.4 
N/A 
74.6 
39.1 
50.0 
50.0 
N/A 
N/A 
39.1 
Average 
39 
14 lotto; 20.6 
instant-scratch 
41.8 table games 
14.7 
46.8 
30.4 
~ § 
~ 
I 
~ 
Sources: Lesieur (1998, table); 'Measuring the Costs of Pathological Gambling,' Address by Prof Henry R. Lesieur, Illinois State University, at the National Conference on ~ 
Gambling Behavior, National Council on Problem Gambling, Chicago, Illinois, 3-5 September 1996 (table). r-' 
NJA, not applicable. ~ 
Added notes of Professor Lesieur: r:Il 
Pathological gamblers spend an inordinate amount of money on gambling compared to others who gamble (Lesieur, 1998). For example, problem video lottery players in Nova 
Scotia account for 4% of those who play, yet contribute 53% of net revenue for video lottery playing (Focal Research, 1998). The Australian Productivity Commission (1999) 
estimated that problem gamblers account for 5.7% of money spent on lottery play, 10.7% of casino table game play, 19% of scratch ticket sales, 33% of wagering on horses and 
dogs, and 42% of money spent on gaming machine play. Overall, problem gamblers expend 33% of all money spent on gambling in Australia. 
Focal Research (1998). 1997/1998 Nova Scotia lottery players' survey. Prepared for Problem Gambling Services, Nova Scotia Department of Health. Halifax, Nova Scotia: 
Author. 
~ 
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consistently refused to acknowledge or calculate 
any costs for pathological gamblers and problem 
gamblers,l34 the National Gambling Impact Study 
Commissionl3s and other sources have begun the 
calculations. l36 In 1994, Resolution 430 of the 
American Medical Association's House of Dele-
gates calculated the US socio-medical costs of 
pathological and problem gamblers at $40 billion 
and increasing. 137 
Significantly, as he was about to retire as editor 
of the Journal of Gambling Studies and a leader of 
the National Council on Problem Gambling (both 
allegedly heavily-influenced by the fmancial aura 
of the gambling indUStry),138 Professor Henry 
Lesieur pointedly calculated the portion of gam-
bling revenues generated by pathological and 
problem gamblers by the type of gambling.139 For 
example, 26.7-55% of casino gambling revenues 
were calculated as coming from pathological and 
problem gamblers (Table 1).140 
The low-profile maintained by the gambling 
industry from the 19608 through the early 1990s 
allowed the industry to expand rapidly. However, 
the high-profile lobbying undertaken by the indus-
try during the mid-l990s probably promoted the 
establishment of industry anathemas such as the 
1999 National Gambling Impact Study C0mmis-
sion and concomitant studies unflattering to the 
image projection desired by the gambling 
industry. 
The US Theory Wbic:b Held the Tobacco 
CompaDies Liable: The Applicability to the 
GamhUng IDdustry 
The second theory which eventually cornered the 
tobacco industry was predicated upon the princi-
ple that as the states were incurring significant 
socio-medical costs to pay for the injuries caused 
by consumers utilizing tobacco products, the 
states should be able to sue the tobacco companies 
directly for those costs without being subrogated 
to the individual claims of persons injured by 
tobacco products. 141 States could bring suits 
against the tobacco companies on their own be-
half without being subjected to classic defenses, 
such as contributory negligence, assumption of the 
risk, and lack of cause_in_fact.142 Calculating that 
the State of Mississippi had spent approximately 
$1 million in health care costs for the treating and 
caring for his secretary's cancer, attorney Michael 
Lewis consulted with Mississippi Attorney Gen-
Copyright C 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
eral Michael Moore and initiated. the first state-
sponsored lawsuit143 against the tobacco 
companies. 144 
Mississippi's suit was quickly followed by law-
suits filed first by the attorney general of Florida 
and then by 40 other states.145 The states' claims 
were enhanced because the tobacco companies 
were vulnerable to the classic claim that they were 
not 'internalizing the externalities' and that, there-
fore, the tobacco companies were being 'unjustly 
enriched' at the expense of the taxpayers. l46 In 
fact, the ideal plaintiff was predicated to be a 
'public hospital', because such an institution· 
would have to pay (i.e., 'internalize') all of the 
costs of treating the diseases and illnesses caused 
by tobacco products (as well as alcohol prod-
ucts)147 without receiving any economic benefit 
whatsoever.l48 As medical centers initiate and/or 
develop their existing treatment centers for patho-
logical and problem gambling, they should track 
these specific costs for future reimbursement. 
By comparison, a Florida suit fIled on 21 
February 1995 against the tobacco indUStry149 
utilized, in part, a 1994 state statute drafted and 
enacted expressly to eliminate the primary de-
fenses historically utilized by the tobacco industry, 
such as the smoker's contributory negligence or 
assumption of the risk. Interestingly, the Florida 
statute would also apply to other industries such 
as the gambling industry. Serving as a model 
statute for other states the Florida statute, the 
Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act1SO provided. 
that: 
Principles of common law and equity as to assign-
ment, lien,. subrogation, comparative negligence, 
assumption of risk, and all other qffumative de-
fenses normally available to a liable third party, are 
to be abrogated to the extent nec:essary to ensure 
run recovery by Medicaid from third-party 
resources ••• lSI 
By 1999, this highlighted language was deleted 
with the net effect of restoring the traditional 
defenses to the tobacco industry, but the pre-exist-
ing case remained valid and Florida's eventual 
settlement totalled $11.3 billion to be received. 
over a 25-year period.ls2 
TRENDS AND CONDmONING FACfORS 
Gambling Addictioo flis-i-,,;s Tobacco Addiction? 
Sociologists generally refer to video-gambling 
machines as the crack-cocaine of creating new 
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addicted gamblers. lS3 'Pathological gambling' is 
referenced and specifically delineated in the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders 154 of the American Psychiatric Association. 
Technically, pathological gambling is listed as an 
'impulse control disorder', but for years, the aca-
demic literature was weD-trended toward recog-
nizing pathological gambling as an official 
addiction - untJ.lthe gambling industry started 
fmancing contrary research. ISS Although in 1980, 
pathological gambling was delimited in the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
an 'MGM Mirage spokesman ... said pathologi-
cal gambling was largely ignored until 1980'.156 
Perhaps before 1980, the industry could argue 
ignorance of the problems, but the industry as a 
whole did not establish or really acknowledge any 
problem gambling until 1995 or 1996, and even 
then many gambling companies did not post 
warnings, take any remedial actions, or fund 
research. 
In 1995, Associate Professor Howard J. Shaffer 
of the Harvard Division on Additions reported: 
Gambling is an wJdictit;e behizvioT, mtJke 110 mislllke 
about it . .. Gambling bas all the properties of a 
psychoactM: subItance, and again, the n:aIIOn is 
that it changes the neurochemistry of the brain. 157 
Furthermore, during a 1995 conference, 'Shaffer 
described gambling as an addiction no less potent 
than drugs or alcohol'. lSI 
However, it was not until 21 February 1996 
with establishment of the NCRGI59 with nearly S2 
million provided mainly by Boyd Gaming C0rpo-
ration and other gambling interests that there was 
a general public acknowledgement by the gam-
bling industry that 1t)his is an industry that recog-
nizes that it has a problem and is willing to deal 
with it in constructive and positive ways'. U50 'The 
lobbying group for the gambling industry, the 
AGA, headed by Frank Fahrenkopf, annou.nced 
that part of the AGA's n:sponsibility was 'to 
develop a cIetIriIIghouse for addressing industry 
issues, including problem gambling' .161 In this 
'clearinghouse' context concerns were raised 
about potential conflicts of interest. 
For years, [Howard) ShatTer bad voiced some of 
the harshest warnings in academia against the 
collateral damage of gambling's growth. No 
longeI'. not since he accepted nearly $600000 
in grants from the industry in little more than a 
year. 
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Through Fahrenkoprs intervention, Shaffer was 
awarded the frrst grant by the industry-backed 
research center [NCRGJ-S139000 ... 162 
The content of this first study by Shaffer was 
criticized,163 and it also did not report the most 
important baseline numbers for the 120-152 stud-
ies analyzed,l64 which made it impossible for 
other academics to check and verify.16S Despite 
requests dating to 1998,166 and despite promising 
to provide these numbers during a 4 May 2000 
conference sponsored by the NCRG at the Uni-
versity of Dlinois at Chicago Medical Center,I67 
by the end of 2000, Associate Professor Shaffer 
had apparently not provided the requested base-
line numbers-a fairly simple procedure. 168 
As summarized by the Los Angeles Times in 
December 1998, 'Shaffer is now working on a new 
project for the industry's research arm [the 
NCRG]-of which he is a board member-for 
S465000, more than triple the amount of the first 
award' .169 Supposedly concerned with some re-
search issues at the NCRG during this time 
frame,l70 Professor Henry Lesieur and Dr. 
Richard Rosenthal terminated their relationship 
with the NCRG research board. 
With regard to the NCRG's research, one criti-
cism is that it is pre-directed: 
'They have an ageoda', says Valerie Lorenz, exec-
utive director of the Compulsive Gambling Center 
Inc. in BaItimote. If the industry can say s0me-
thing is neuroIogK:alIy wrong with a problem gam-
bler, 'then it's not the casinos' responsibility', she 
says. 1'1 
In 1998, however, Shaffer did acknowledge the 
'increasing trend'172 of more problem gamblers 
which among other reasons he attributed173 to 
'easy access to casinos. lotteries and credit'. 174 
Interestingly, the NCRG, which had been cen-
tered at the University of Missouri at Kansas City 
(UMKC) since its 1996 inception, annou.nced in 
2000 that it was moving to the Harvard Division 
OD Addictions proximate to Shaffer. 'I'bese types 
of associations raise questions of conflicts of in-
terest and do not particularly benefit the research, 
the academics involved, or even the industry's 
goals. 
Regardless of these debates, the individualized 
problems of gambling addiction are exemplified 
by one 1998 Chicago, Dlinois case where a mother 
addicted to gambling allegedly killed one and 
perhaps two of her children in separate instances 
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to collect 5200000 of insurance money so she 
could continue to gamble.17S This scenario re-
sulted in a conviction and the subsequent impris-
onment of the mother. 
State-sponsored gambling as government policy 
was further criticized in 1997 when it became 
public that the Colorado lottery was utilizing a 
'Mindsort' model which allegedly was designed to 
appeal to pathological and problem gamblers, and 
which indicated that consistent gamblers were 
'Lower on trial, but once hooked, hooked'.176 A 
1997 in-depth survey by the Chicago Sun-Times 
reported that poor people were viewing the 'in-
stant games' of the lottery as 'a source of in-
come',177 and in a parallel survey it was reported 
that 51% of the people gambling were trying 'to 
win money,' instead of gambling for entertain-
ment (34%).178 
Recognizing that research has reported that 
27-55% of casino revenues are coming from 
pathological gamblers and problem gamblers, 179 
concerns have also been raised about appeals to 
this market segment. 
By purcbasing lists from credit-card companies, 
the casinos know what you buy, and then they can 
track census data to approximate your home value 
and income. Then there are the direct-mail lists. 
One such list from the early 19908 was baldly 
called the 'Compulsive Gamblers SpeciDJ' and 
promised to deliver 200000 names of people with 
'unquenchable appetites for all forms of gam-
bling'. Another list featun:s 'some 250000 hard-
core gamblen'. Yet another purveys the names of 
80000 people who responded to a vaca.tion-
sweepstakes-telketing pitch. ISO 
In addition to this criticism, there exists the 
allegation that gambling companies are profiling 
their customers' financial/gambling tendencies via 
the computerized cards customers are often re-
quired to carry in order to gamble. 
Christopher W. Anderson of Chicago. who super-
vises gambling couoaelors in St. Louis. has seen 
such customer profiles because they were subpoe-
naed in c:rimina1 cases. In one, the customer bad 
been arrested at the casino for writing bad checks. 
The patron's profile 'shows that casinos know 
certain individuals have gambling problems but do 
absolutely nothing to intervene, ... '.181 
Apparently, gambling companies have sophisti-
cated marketing knowledge of their customers 
which can be potentially misused to benefit the 
companies. 182 
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By comparison, in the 1970s it was supposedly, 
popularly recognized that 'cigarette smokers be-
have remarkably like heroin addicts . .. [and] that 
cigarette smoking ... [constitutes] an addic-
tion' .183 However, the juries in the tobacco cases 
generally did not accept the argument that smok-
ing was as addictive as heroin.l84 Given this trend 
in the tobacco cases, similar 'addiction' arguments 
in pathological gambling cases (if argued before 
juries instead of judges) would probably fail until 
popular sentiment changed-despite the weight 
of authority which indicated a trend toward 
recognizing pathological gambling as an 
addiction. ISS 
The Trend Toward Obfuscating the Issues 
Juries apparently adopted a libertarian philoso-
phy in the tobacco cases and often accepted the 
legal defense of assumption of the risk; that is, the 
plaintiff consumers knew or should have known 
the risk of smoking, voluntarily began to smoke, 
and intentionally continued to use tobacco. 186 
Such a libertarian philosophy apparently also in-
fected the US public's imagination when dealing 
with the negative socio-economic consequences of 
gambling addiction. In other words, the public 
perception was that if people gambled too much it 
was their own responsibility. 
For decades, the Nevada gambling establish-
ment, in pa.rticular, ignoredl87 or even deniedlBB 
that there existed such a disorder as 'pathological 
gambling' or the associated 'problem gambling'. 
According to one expert '[i]n 1980 they weren't 
interested in deaHng with compulsive (i.e., patho-
logical) gambling and were afraid to deal with 
it' .189 Howard ShatTer further confused the issues 
when he proposed a new nomenclature in 1997 of 
'levels' of 'disordered gambling'l90 instead of the 
generally accepted terms of 'pathological gam-
bling' and 'problem gambling'. 
In 1987, however, Harrah's casino company 
'began examining the issue' .191 Critics claimed 
that the program initiated by Harrah's was largely 
'window-dressing' for public relations purposes, 192 
but it still constituted the first accepted effort by a 
casino company to recognize problems involving 
those who gambled too much, and by 1996 the 
AGA's Frank Fahrenkopf purported that 'the 
attitude of the industry has changed'.193 By com-
parison, other gambling companies continued to 
deny that there was much of a problem, if any 
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problem, until at least the mid-l990s, when a 
series of articles put the gambling industry on the 
defensive and highlighted the problems of patho-
logical and problem gamblers. l94 
Trying not to repeat the mistakes of the to-
bacco industry in denying for decades the prob-
lems . associated with their product, the lobbying 
group representing the gambling industry, the 
AGA, mobilized the gambling industry in the 
mid-l990s to admit finally some problems, includ-
ing the problem that a certain percentage of gam-
blers would develop gambling problems and fall 
into the categories of 'pathological gamblers' and 
'problem gamblers'.19s 
As the US Congress embarrassed the gambling 
industry with the enactment of the 1996 National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission Act, the 
AGA scrambled to document the gambling indus-
try's pre-existing concern for pathological gam-
blers and problem gamblers. However, the AGA 
could only produce scant industry examples basi-
cally from four US gambling companies and had 
to resort for examples to four Canadian/govern-
ment-sponsored examples plus the Washington 
State Council of the State of Washington. l96 
These examples were originally collated in an 
AGA 1996 loose-leaf binder entitled the 'Respon-
sible Gaming Resource Guide', 197 which instead 
of emphasizing gambling problems among the 
adult clientele tended to emphasize casino-
employee problems and the prohibitions against 
underage gambling. 198 
By comparison, one of the favorite defenses of 
the tobacco industry in a similar context was to 
deny any cause-in-fact (i.e., 'connection' or nexus) 
between the use of the product and the resultant 
claimed injury. Attorneys representing the to-
bacco industry would often flood juries with so 
many other potential causes for the plaintiffs' 
injuries that individual juries could not fmd a 
preponderance of the evidence indicating that the 
tobacco product had caused the injury. 199 
Similarly, during the 1990s, the gambling indus-
try began to position itself with alternate theories 
which obfuscated the classic symptoms associated 
with pathological gambling, as well as with prob-
lem gambling. The gambling industry also al-
legedly became involved in efforts to change the 
definitions, and even the terminology involved in 
delimiting what constituted a 'pathological gam-
bler' and a 'problem gambler'. 200 Another factor 
which would assist the gambling industry in con-
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fusing juries with other cause-in-fact issues in-
volves the comorbidity of pathological gambling 
with the excessive use of alcohol and tobacco 
products. In other words, there appears to be 
some connection between the excessive use of 
alcohol and/or tobacco and pathological gam-
bling, but the research efforts on these comorbid-
ity issues are still in their infancy. 
Despite these considerations, attorneys pursu-
ing the gambling industry under theories involv-
ing pathological gambling issues and cause-in-fact 
will probably not be successful until there is a 
significant change in public perceptions. 
POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
GeaeraI Policy AltematiYes for the US 
One generally recognized recommendation in-
volves educating the public with the potential 
hazards of becoming addicted to various forms of 
gambling-both legal and illegal. While at first, it 
would appear that such a goal would be relatively 
easy to implement, the gambling industry has an 
obvious self-interest in downplaying any negative 
consequences associated with gambling activities, 
and the industry has the financial reserves to 
promulgate an extensive 'win-win' public rela-
tions campaign throughout the public domain. 
One of the policies which the states could adopt 
would involve taking no action with regard to the 
socio-economic costs and medical costs caused by 
the gambling industry. This scenario seems un-
likely since the success which the states have had 
in pursuing mega-lawsuits against the tobacco 
industry have encouraged them to file similar 
lawsuits against other industries, such as gun 
manufacturers. The gambling industry will be an 
obvious target on the list for states to me mega-
lawsuits. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the states 
could immediately initiate mega-lawsuits against 
the gambling industry which were similar to the 
mega-lawsuits against the tobacco and fll'CaI'IIlS 
industrieg201 during the 1990s. The gambling in-
dustry, however, could argue as a policy defense 
that the states did not have 'clean hands' because 
the states legalized gambling, particularly casino-
style gambling, during the 19808 and 19908 and 
should not thereafter be allowed to benefit finan-
cially via mega-lawsuits against an industry which 
the states have promoted. 
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The states could counter this argument by 
claiming that they were deceived by the gambling 
industry with regard to the cost/benefits of intro-
ducing gambling into state economies and with 
regard to the socio-economic negatives accompa-
nying gambling activities, particularly the costs 
associated with pathological and problem gam-
blers. Still, the defmitive analysis of the various 
'studies' utilized to convince legislators of the 
benefits associated with legalizing various types of 
gambling, Legalized Gambling as a Strategy for 
Economic Development,202 was a 1994 report pre-
pared by the Center for Economic Development 
at the University of Massachusetts. This report 
revealed that the studies produced and/or fi-
nanced by the gambling industry were largely 
'unbalanced'. In other words, state governments 
were misled, if not deceived, by the gambling 
industry. This report's conclusions regarding the 
obfuscation of the cost/benefit impacts of intra-
d~ ~ gambling activities inoo state 
economies reflected poorly upon the gambling 
industry, and these conclusions were also largely 
confmned by the NGISC Fmal Report203 pro-
duced by the 1999 National Gambling Impact 
Study Commission. 
Another alternative would be for the states 00 
proceed slowly with their projected mega-lawsuits, 
while collecting additional data. In this scenario, 
the states should finance studies analyzing the 
socio-economic negatives associated with legalized 
gambling activities; specifically, addicted (patho-
logical) gamblers, bankruptcies, and crime and 
corruption. 
One strategic policy concern for government 
decisionmakers involves whether the goal is 00 
reduce the public's utilization of the aDeged p0-
tentially-hazardous product204 or whether the goal 
is simply to have the de facto imposition of in-
creased costs on the industry-which are .then 
just passed along to consumers in the form of 
increased prices. 'lOS Perhaps the fundamental issue 
is whether governments should be promoting 
something which is not conducive to the public's 
health, safety, and welfare. In this context, there is 
a salient difference between the oobacco industry 
and the gambling industry-specifically, the to-
bacco industry has saturated the· US public mar-
ket for centuries, whereas legalized gambling 
during the 20th century never approached market 
saturation206 and constituted a relatively new phe-
nomenon for the beginning of the 21st century. 
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This latter scenario involving gambling means 
that governments may still maintain gambling's 
various forms as crimina1ized-with minimal so-
cial consequences or public backlash. By compari-
son, recriminaljzing tobacco 'would involve a 
public response reflective of centuries of market 
saturation (with no history of ever been criminal-
ized in the US). 
Mega-lawsuits by the state atoomey generals 
combined with private lawsuits involving class 
actions might easily prod state legislators into 
simply increasing taxes on the various forms of 
legalized gambling. For example, in Canada, all 
of the casino profits go to the government, and 
the government merely pays a management fee to 
the casino companies for managing the casino 
properties. The result is that all of the profits go 
to the government. By contrast, the tax rate for 
casinos in the US fluctuates at approximately 15% 
of casino revenues to the host state and another 
5% 00 the local municipalities with all of the 
profits going 00 the casino companies. Further-
more, Native American casinos theoretically must 
pay nothing in taxes to their host states (although 
'gaming compacts' with the individual states are 
supposedly negotiated to provide the states with 
some revenues). 
With regard to both Native American casinos 
and regular non-Indian casinos, the states have 
been embarrassingly out-negotiated. The net re-
sult is that US casinos create minuscule tax 
revenues for the states compared 00 the socio-
economic costs created by the new pathological 
gamblers and problem gamblers who are created 
by the legalization of gambling activities. Even 
with the Canadian model of aD profits going to 
the government, the socio-economic costs of legal-
izing gambling activities overwhelm the benefits 
(i.e., new tax revcnues).21D7 Furthermore, the 
Canadian government must necessarily be amused 
with the ridiculously low tax rates which the US 
casinos enjoy-particularly since such low tax 
rates raise a 'red flag' signaling the appearance of 
corrupt decision-making. 
Economie CwdJicts of Iaten:st for tile States! 
Not a Bar to Mega-LaWllllits 
In the precedent of the tobacco mega-lawsuits, 
several oobacco-producing states also filed suit 
against the tobacco companies, and were eventu-
ally part of the overall settlement agreements. 
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This situation demonstrated that the states could 
have it both ways, and they could encourage 
tobacco production while filing lawsuits for the 
Medicaid/Medicare types of costs for tobacco-
related illnesses. 
There are obvious parallels with those states 
which have legalized gambling activities. Theoreti-
cally, those states which have legalized different 
gambling activities can also initiate lawsuits for 
the costs associated with pathological gambling 
and problem gambling. but they need to be pre-
pared to document treatment costs and associated 
state costs. The gambling industry appears to be 
quite vulnerable, and as a potential response has 
begun to finance 'studies' which somehow seem to 
report the socio-economic costs of gambling to be 
at the lower end of the spectrum, while non-indus-
try studies tend to report higher costs.208 
The fact that the tobacco-producing states had 
no qualms about suing the tobacco industry 
'should not be a surprise considering that the 
injury and damage caused by cigarettes far ex-
ceed[ed] the value of the jobs and income that 
cigarettes ... [brought] to the state[S]'.209 With 
regard to the gambling industry, throughout the 
199Os, there was growing evidence substantiating 
that the socio-economic costs of legalized gam-
bling activities by creating new addicted gamblers, 
new bankruptcies, and new crime and corruption 
outweighed the value of the jobs and income to 
the residents of the states in which the legalized 
gambling activities were located. 
The Gravamen of the Potaltial Mega-Lawsuits 
apiIIst die GuabIiDg IDdastry 
One of the main issues will be the costs associated 
with 'pathological gambling' and 'problem gam-
bling'. The tobacco industry has argued that the 
costs of tobacco-related illnesses are ill-deflned 
and diffJCUlt to ca1cuIatc, but this consideration 
did not prevent the states from negotiating multi-
billion dollar settlements with the tobacco indus-
try. Even more ilklefmed and speculative are the 
costs associated with handguns,210 but again this 
appears not to be a bar to several states, cities, 
and counties filing lawsuits against handgun man-
ufacturers. By comparison, the costs incurred by 
states in addressing the medical, social and crime 
costs associated with pathological gamblers and 
problem gamblers have been calculated in several 
studies but this area of academic investigation still 
needs more state-sponsored research. 
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Prior to the mid-l990s, the medical and social 
costs associated with treating and remedying the 
negatives committed by the individual pathologi-
cal gambler ranged between $13200 and $52000 
(unadjusted to present value).21l The higher num-
bers were published and/or verified in a reviewed 
article published in the Journal of Gambling Stud-
ieS.212 The higher end of the spectrum was given 
the actual or implied imprimatur of the Journal-
even though the Journal was influenced, to a 
greater or lesser degree, by the interests of the 
gambling industry. In particular, William Eading-
ton, a well-known apologist for the gambling 
industry, became one of the two main editors of 
the Journal when its predecessor, the Journal of 
Gambling Behavior, ran into fmancial difficulty 
and needed the support of the gambling industry. 
Specifically, the 1989 Journal of Gambling Be-
havior was sponsored by the National Council on 
Compulsive Gambling, but in Spring 1990: 
1. the Journal's name had changed to the Journal 
of Gambling Studies; 
2. the name of the National Council on Compul-
sive Gambling had changed to the National 
Council on 'Problem' Gambling (a terminol-
ogy more acceptable to gambling interests); 
3. the sponsonhip of the Journal had changed to 
include the newly-named National Council on 
Problem Gambling plus the Institute for the 
Study of Gambling and Commercial Gaming 
under the directorship of William Eadington 
of the University of Nevada at Reno; and 
4. William Eadington had joined the initial edi-
tor, Professor Henry Lesieur, as co-editor of 
the newly-named Journal.213 
After 1996, Professor Henry Lesieur retired as 
editor of the Journal and was replaced by Associ-
ate Professor Howard Shaffer of Harvard's Divi-
sion on Addictions.214 
Since the early 19808, one of the pre-eminent 
researchers in the field of pathological gambling 
has been Valerie Lorenz, PhD, the Executive Di-
rector of the Compulsive Gambling Center in 
Baltimore (fonnerly the 'National' Compulsive 
Gambling Center) and a IS-year member of the 
Journal's editorial board. Before the Dlinois Gam-
ing Board in May 2000, and in other venues, Dr 
Lorenz criticized the credibility of studies financed 
by the gambling indUStry,2lS including Howard 
Shaffer's 1997 Harvard Addictions Meta-analy-
sis216 which obfuscated the issues with the new 
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proposed terminology of 'disordered gambling'. 217 
Perhaps coincidentally, Dr Lorenz was thereafter 
advised by the Journal of Gambling Studies' man-
aging editor Howard ShafTer that her services on 
the editorial board would no longer be re-
quired21s-although Dr Lorenz had served on the 
editorial board since the Journal's inception 15 
years earlier. 
Such examples fuel the argument that since the 
departure of Professor Henry Lesieur as the Jour-
nal's co-editor after the 1996 issues of the Journal, 
it has become inordinately influenced by gambling 
interests. This inordinate influence argument is 
also supported by the fact that primary adminis-
trative communication for the Journal appears to 
be between (1) editor Howard Shaffer, (2) the 
publisher, (3) editor William Eadington (at the 
University of Nevada at Reno and the Institute 
for the Study of Gambling and Commercial Gam-
ing), and (4) Keith Whyte a former employee of 
the AGA and in 2000 the director of the Journal's 
co-sponsor, the National Council on Problem 
Gamblingll9 (which is largely financed by gam-
bling interests).220 
Another similar venue, which publishes many 
pro-industry articles, is the self-styled Gaming 
Law Review-which is misleading since it has no 
university sponsor. Founded in 1997, the Gaming 
Review is vulnerable to being labeled as primarily 
a gambling industry publication. With a few ex-
ceptions, the editorial board for the Gaming Re-
view consists of gambling industry consultants, 
columnists for industry magazines, and lobbyists 
(such as lobbyist Frank Fahrenkopf, Chief Execu-
tive Officer (CEO) of the AGA). Notably, when 
the Gaming Review was fIrSt established in spring 
1997, a public relations lobbyist for the AGA 
(Keith S. Whyte) was listed as an editor. 
Since the cost estimates ranging up to $52000 
per pathological gambler were published and the 
methodology of determining them verifIed by the 
Journal, the gambling industry has been trying to 
lower these cost estimates via promoting new 
studies.Z21 Critics of the gambling industry found 
it ironic that apologists for the gambling industry 
had not questioned any of these higher cost esti-
mates throughout the 19808 and early 1990s-al-
though they claimed years of experience in 
analyzing these issues.222 Since the mid-l990s, the 
gambling industry has scrambled to promulgate 
new cost estimates-which as might be expected, 
have been lower than the earlier estimates. 
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One interesting scenario involves the NORC, 
which performed the cost estimates for the Na-
tional Gambling Impact Study Commission.223 
The NORC estimated very few of the types of 
applicable costs and entirely omitted some types 
of costs. Consequently, these estimates were noto-
riously low and, therefore, lacked credibility. 224 
The methodology utilized by NORC in calculat-
ing these estimates has been criticized as being 
flawed and incomplete-particularly regarding 
methodology.225 Other estimates which are at the 
lower end of the spectrum have been performed 
by reputable groups, such as the $10000 figure 
reported by the Wisconsin Policy Research Insti-
tute,226 but it is important to note that these are 
only partial listings of the total costs.227 Public 
relations experts for the gambling industry tend to 
seize on these lower estimates without revealing to 
the public that they constitute only partial costs. 
The spectre of intimidated academics has also 
been raised as in the case of the NORC estimates. 
When the academics from NORC were giving 
their preliminary report to the National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission, they were severely 
criticized by the gambling industry representatives 
sitting on the Commission. One commissioner 
representing the gambling industry even threat-
ened the academics with legal action, claiming 
that their methodology and data collection meth-
ods were flawed.228 Skeptics noted that the 
NORC final report thereafter reported very con-
servative estimates involving both the costs of 
pathological gamblers and the prevalence of 
pathological gamblers in the general population. 
The NORC also changed the defInitional ap-
proach to calculating the prevalence of pathologi-
cal gamblers but signif1C8Dtly, these changes were 
never incorporated into the academic literature by 
the general academic community. It is common 
practice when introducing new measures or statis-
tics to calculate the old as well as the proposed 
new ones on the same data to provide a compari-
son or benchmark. NORC provided no such 
comparison/benchmark. 
Strategic CoacerDs IDYohriDg Mega-Lawsuits 
Some legal theorists have opined that govern-
ments have brought their actions against the to-
bacco and firearms industries without the bona 
fide intent of ever taking those cases to their 
ultimate conclusions in full-fledged trials. In other 
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words, instead of the tobacco industry utilizing its 
General Patton strategy of wearing down the 
opposition of individual plaintiffs,229 the states 
were paradoxically wearing down the tobacco in-
dustry by coordinating the actions of state attor-
ney generals with a strategy which increased 
dramatically the downside risks of any litigation 
which went to its ultimate conclusion. However, 
given the history of the tobacco litigation 
throughout previous decades, it appeared unlikely 
that the tobacco industry would be impressed 
with this type of legal strategy if the industry did 
not indeed believe that the state attorney generals 
would take their causes of action to their ultimate 
conclusions in the court system. 
By comparison, questions arise as to what 
should be the ultimate goals of the states in 
bringing mega-lawsuits against the gambling in-
dustry. One question involves whether it is neces-
sary for the states to theorize the substantive 
content of any potential settlement with the gam-
bling industry. This question would also involve 
whether or not settlements would need to be 
negotiated with the various market segments of 
the gambling industry such as lottery suppliers, 
off-track betting parlors, casinos, providers of 
electronic gambling devices, and other various 
groups. However, the payment of damages for 
government expenses occasioned by gambling ad-
diction, including personal fmancial hardship, and 
parallel socio-economic costs do not necessarily 
have to have a close nexus to the relief requested 
by the states in their underlying complaints 
against the industry. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that actions based on the RICO statutes 
can ask for treble damages.230 
As judicial approval of settlements is required 
in government cases involving federal class-action 
suits,231 government attorneys may wish to note 
that these lawsuits do not need to be brought as 
class actions per se. However, the net effect of 
these types of lawsuits often resembles class-
action cases, particularly since large elements of 
the public are lepIesented by the attorneys seek-
ing the redress. By comparison, RICO actions 
brought as civil suits232 against the industry can 
be brought by private attorneys (who can receive 
reasonable attorneys' fees), but the subject class of 
plaintiffs must be approved by judicial decision-
making. 
Another issue involves the potential settlement 
monies. In any potential settlement involving the 
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gambling industry, a fundamental concern for 
those states recovering damages would be how 
those damages should be utilized. By comparison, 
there was substantial criticism of the ways in 
which settlement monies from the tobacco indus-
try were utilized by the various states.233 In Illi-
nois, for example, most of the settlement monies 
($350 million) that were initiated from the to-
bacco industry were given as property tax rebates 
to the Illinois taxpayers.234 While this scenario 
may have ingratiated those officials then in office 
to the electorate, particularly since the property 
tax rebates were received by the electorate ap-
proximately 30 days before the election on 7 
November 2000, strategic policymakers, including 
Illinois Attorney General James Ryan, voiced 
concerns about the long-term impacts of these 
types of policies.235 The net effect appeared to be 
a 'backdoor' tax hike on the tobacco companies 
with the costs passed along to smokers and with-
out any significant government commitment to 
reduce smoking.236 
A familiar criticism of the tobacco settlement is 
that as it was structured it would not make any 
substantive changes in the regulation of the to-
bacco industry.237 The settlement employed con-
trol and performance-based regulations which 
would impose specific requirements on tobacco 
companies and tell those companies what must be 
accomplished, but leave them to decide the mech-
anisms.238 Alternatively, suggestions for incentive-
based regulation would be arguably IOOre effective 
and force the ftrms to internalize the total costs of 
their activities.239 Perhaps this latter policy ap-
proach should also be utilized regarding the gam-
bling industry and any potential settlement. 
The Pitfalls of Delayed State ActioD: Test Cases 
by GambIiDg Interests to Promote aad Protect 
the Gambling Iadustry 
During an October 2000 conference, three poten-
tial causes of action rendering the gambling indus-
try vulnerable during the 21st century were 
addressed and highlighted by Tim Kelly, the for-
mer Executive Director of the National Gambling 
Impact Study Commission. These causes of action 
included: (1) lawsuits based on the active or pas-
sive misrepresentation of the gambling industry 
directed at vulnerable audiences, (2) public nui-
sance actions against governmental entities for 
creating harm to the public, and (3) qui tam 
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actions, in which a private citizen could sue as a 
private attorney general via an action which the 
state did not bring, but should have. lAO 
However, regardless of any potentially-produc-
tive legal theories which would support state 
mega-lawsuits against the gambling industry, the 
a,ttomey generals of the various states needed to 
become more educated on the issues and informed 
of the trends. In addition to the gambling indus-
try's trend toward fmancially dominating the di-
rection of the research, the 1ega11andscape was 
also being challenged via test cases favored by 
gambling interests. 
One example consists of the former restrictions 
on the US advertising of gambling activities, and 
the gambling industry's reversal of those restric-
tions via a test case. This issue area was exempli-
fied by regulations in Puerto Rico, restricting the 
advertising of gambling activities. Under Puerto 
Rico's Games of Chance Act of 1948,241 certain 
forms of gambling were allowed but the legisla-
tion provided that 'no gambling room shall be 
permitted to advertise or otherwise offer their 
facilities to the public of Puerto Rico'.242 In the 
US Supreme Court case Postldos de Puerto lUeo 
Assoc. v. TOIIriam Co. Puerto 1Uco,243 the constitu-
tionality of that statute was held valid.244 The net 
effect of Posadas was to restrict or prohibit the 
advertising of actual gambling activities in the 
US. However, Posadas was limited by Greater 
New Orlean.s Broadcasting .Assoc. Inc. v. US24S 
and challenged by a para)lel Nevada test case246 
supported by gambling industry lobbyists to allow 
for nationwide advertising of gambling activi-
ties-just the mTective opposite of the ban on the 
television advertising of tobaax> products. 
The Iateaface of GwMag-FinaanMI Research 
.... tile US Sllpleaae Court: Brief Amit:Iu ear;. 
for tile AGA in Support of Petitioaers, GretIter 
N." OrIuaI'BrtNIdetutiag A~ Inc. 11. 
US (US Supreme Court, October Term 1998, 
No. 98-387) 
The cases involving the advertising of gambling 
also highlight other issues. For example, is it 
misleading to the US Supreme Court for an ami-
cus brief to substantiate most of its argmnents by 
referencing studies which were paid for by the 
lobbyists filing the brief-without speclflC811y 
highlighting to the US Supreme Court that those 
studies were fmanaxt by the lobbyists? 
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In its amicus brief for the Greater New Orleans 
case, the AGA stated specifically 'The AGA 
therefore offers this Court an overview of the 
more current and reliable studies of the social and 
economic impacts of the commercial casino indus-
try'.247 Furthermore, the AGA's amicus brief 
claimed 'the conclusion reached in Posadas will 
not shield §1304 from constitutional attack unless 
the government can satisfy its burden to present 
credible evidence of the deleterious effects of 
casino gaming'. 248 To support its argument, the 
AGA cited as its primary exhibit (designated as 
'AGAL 1')249 Casinos and Crime; An Analysis of 
the Evidence (December 1997) by Jeremy Mar-
80lis.25O This exhibit, for example, was the most 
frequently cited so-called 'authority'.2S1 However, 
it was financed by the AGA2S2 and during 1997, 
Jeremy Margolis was registered on the Illinois 
1997 Lobbyist L~3 as representing casinos, 
which was his situation throughout most of the 
1990s.154 Throughout the 199Os, Margolis was a 
registered Illinois lobbyist for several gambling 
interests such as Harrah's; Hilton; Caesar's 
World; Circus, Circus; and the Jo Daviess River-
boat Corporation.2SS 
Regardless of these issues, the Greater New 
Orleans case was decided in favor of the gambling 
interests' practical concerns to eliminate restric-
tions on the advertising of gambling, and nebu-
lous gambling-fmanced research was being 
utilized to substantiate industry claims. 
In smnmary, it was apparent to the Los Angeles 
Tunes, that 'the industry ... [was] waging a 
multi-million dollar campaign to discredit critics 
and blunt the work of. .. (the] national commis-
sion exploririg the human cost of 1ega.liD:d wager-
ing'.2S6 Apparently, this was a 'carefully crafted 
effort-backed by the ... casinos and other pow-
erful Las Vegas interests ... '.251 
CONCLUSION 
According to Tom Grey, the Executive Director 
of the NCALG (1999), 
The NGISC report will act like the Surgeon Gen-
eral's 1964 report on smoking and health-a 
wake-up caD for America on the dangers of gam-
bling. This report makes it very clear that gam-
bling is not just another form of recreation-it is 
a very addictive and destructive activity. In fact, 
the hazards of gambling are so severe that the 
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commission called on schools from elementary 
levels through college to wake-up and warn stu-
dents 'of the dangers of gambling'. In short, gam-
bling is the next tobacco.2S8 
Owing to costs created by new addicted gam-
blers, bankruptcies, and crime once gambling is 
legalized, some have argued that gambling estab-
lishments should be held liable for the costs they 
place on society. 259 Legal experts have suggested 
that there might be a lot of money made by suing 
the entities that get people addicted to gam-
bling. UiO This trend is evidenced by the tobacco 
mega-lawsuits that have reached into the billions 
of dollars.261 Upon close inspection, there are 
many parallels in the behavior of the tobacco 
industry vis-a-vis the gambling industry. These 
similarities are evidenced in similar tactics involv-
ing political contributions and lobbying efforts, as 
well as industry-sponsored studies attempting to 
obfuscate, or even negate, legitimate research. 
Furthermore, the marketing techniques of the 
gambling industry largely parallel those of the 
tobacco industry-which can be visualized when 
the Joe Camel of the 19908 becomes the Joe 
Casino of the 21st century.262 As one commenta-
tor rhetorically quizzed the public: 'If you thought 
Joe Camel was bad, what would you think about 
an industry that entices kids to play slot 
machines?' .263 
Considering that teenagers during the 19908 
were already evidencing double the pathological 
and problem gambling rate of the adult popula-
tion, the problem of addicted gamblers and the 
associated cost factors are projected to continue 
to increase in the future as more legalized gam-
bling activities spread to new jurisdictions. Ac-
cordingly, the states would be well advised to 
calculate their socio-economic costs involving 
gambling using calculation methods comparable 
to the costs involving tobacco. According to the 
NGISC ExecutifJe Summary, 'it is conceivable that 
someday gambling enterprises may be franchised 
and, at least in parts of the country, become as 
common as fast food outlets are today'.264 1bere-
fore, with market saturation via legalized gam-
bling a definite possibility whereby portions of the 
country could parallel the saturated effects of a 
market such as the Mississippi Gulf Coast, Ne-
vada, or Atlantic City, states will need to project 
their costs into the future-which means billions 
of dollars paralleling the tobacco settlements. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table At *. 1.5 MDIioD People or 0.51'18 of U.s. Population Beeame New PfIthological Gamblers in 3 
Years froID 1994-1997 (Dmsion 011 AddidioDs, Hanard Medical School) 
U.S. population IDcreue in addicted gambJerr 
(1994 -+ 1997)1 0.84% (1994) -+ 1.290/. (1997) 
262 miDion-+268 2.2 milIion'-+4.4 million4 
. million (Harvani Addictions) 
• Footnotes at end of this artide. 
New addicted New costs to u.S. taxpayers 
gamblers (1994-+ 1997) per ycar*. (1998) 
I.S millionS $22.5 biJIion per year6 
Comparison: u.s. drug abuse 
costs = S70 billion per year7 
•• Numbers may easily be acljtWed to cum::nt dollars by visiting the 'Cousumer Price Jnde:x (AD Urban Consumers)' of the 
U.s. Blueau of Labor Statistic:s at http://DtLbla..pv/ and utilizing the following formula eumpIe: 
CPI Currant Year 
S Former Year x CPI Former Year = S Cummt Year 
166.6 (1999) 
$4000000 (1983) x 99.6 (1983) ... 56690763 (1999) 
Table A2*. 35 MDIioD People 81' rl8 of u.s. Population Became New Problem Gamblers iD 3 Years 
from 1994-1", (Dmsioa - AddietioDs, Hamri Medical School) 
U.s. populatiOD 
(1994 -+ 1997)1 
Increue in problem ga.mblcrs2 New problem gamblers New costs to U.S. 
2.93% (1994)-+4.88% (1997) (1994-+ 1997) taxpayers per year*. (1998) 
262 million -+ 268 
million 
7.6 JDi1lioD3-+ 11 miIIion4 3.S million' S17.5 billion per year' 
(Harvard Addictioas) Comparison: U.S. drug abuse 
costs - S70 billion per year7 
• Footnotes at end of this article. 
- NumbeIB may easily be aclj1IIted to cum::nt dollars by vililiD& the 'Couumer Price IDdIm (AD Urban Consumers)' of the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://ltata.bJa.pv/ and utiJiziDJ the following formula aampIc: 
CPI Current Year 
S Former Year x CPI FOI'IDIIr Year .. S CumDt Year 
Rumple: 166.6 (1999) 
$4000000 (1983) x 99.6 (1983) - 56690763 (1999) 
Table A3*. 15 Milia People ... 8.5% ef U.s. P.,...,- Jh=une New p~ Gamblers in 3 
Years froIIll994-1997 (DhisioD - AddJdiI8, u...... Medical SdIooJ) 
u.s. population Incnue in pedlloJoP:aI pm.bIr:rs2 New pathoIop:al pmhIcn Total aew costs 
(1994-1997)1 (1994-1997) 0.84%-+1.29% (BtL) (1994-1997)' (Est.)- (1994-1997) 
262 miDioD-+ 
268 million 
2.2 miJIion-+4.4 mi1IioD 
• Footnotes at end of this uticIe. 
Rap ofaew ~ costB: 
ProbabJe rBDF (partial costa): 
Would. DOt estimate? 
$22.5 biItion 
S24 billion -+541 billion 
S40 biIIioD -+561 billion 
S40 biDioD -+ SSO billion 
Woald JIOt estimate? 
S40 biDion -+ SIS billion 
S24 biDion -+ S88 billion 
S40 billion -+SSO biDion 
- Numbers may eaaily be IMijuIted to c:DmIIlt dollars by ftIitiag the "CoJwumer Price IDdIm (AD Urban Consumers)' of 
the U.s. Bmeau of Labor Statistics at http://staU.bJa.p/8Ild utilizing the following formula cump1e: 
Qtl Cummt Year 
S Formr:r Year x CPI Former Year ... S Cum:ot Year 
BxampJe: 166.6 (1999) 
$400000O (1983) x 99.6 (1983) 56690763 (1999) 
Copyright C 2001 John Wiley &; Sons, Ltd. Manage. Decis. &on. n: 17-63 (2001) 
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Table A4*. Bankruptcy Costs**-Costs of 1.5 MDlion New Pllthologica1 Gamblersl 1994-1997 
Socio-economic costs category 
21% fUed bankruptcies3 
> 20% (SMR researchr 
23% (Wis., Thompson)6 
28% (Quebec)6 
Costs per bankruptcy' (SMR) (WEF A: 
533308)1 
LepI cOstsB 
Court costsI 
Admin. costs" (Thompson: 'too low') 
> 10"10 (projected to 15%) of total bankruptcy 
costs lO of S40 billion per yearll and 1.35 
million filingsll per year 
Average cost 
5113 640' (1995) 
529 650 (1997) 
5505-.51000 (1997) 
5418 -.5837 (1997) 
5100 ? (1995) 
Pathological gamblers - 75% of total gambling/bankruptcy prob1em12 
Problem gamblers = 25% of total gambling/bankruptcy prob1em12 
Annual Range: ? 
Total new bankruptcy costs due to pathological gamblers, 1994-1997: ? 
Average cost 
(adjusted2 to 
current 5)·· 
529650 
5505-.51000 
5418-.5837 
Population Total new 
creating new costs·· 
problem (1998) 
45 
Note: Usually ignored by bankruptcy attorneys, it was historically rcquiRd that anyone filing for bankruptcy indicate moncy 
and assets lost bccaUllC of gambling during the year, including 'datca, D8JIICS, and places, and the amounts of moncy . .. lost'. 
11 U.S.C. Appendix, Bankruptcy Rules, Form 7, in 1 Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law 46 (1986). 
• Footnotes at cad of this article . 
•• Numbers may cuiIy be adjusted to cummt dollars by visiting the 'Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers)' of the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://stats.bls.gov/ and utilizing the following formula example: 
CPI Current Year 
5 Former Year x CPI Formcr Year = 5 Current Year 
Example: 166.6 (1999) 
54000000 (1983) x 99.6 (1983) = 56690763 (1999) 
Table A5*. Baakraptcy eosas--Costs of 3.5 MiDioa New Problem Gamblers! 1994-1997 
Socio-cconomic costs category 
31% filed bankruptcies' (10% Kindt Conscrvativc No.t 
Costs per bankruptcy' (SMR.) (WEF A: S33 308)6 
LepI costs' 
Court costs' 
Admin. costs' (Thompson: 'too Iow') 
> 10"10 (projected to 15%) of total bankruptcy costs" of 
S40 billion per year' and 1.35 million filiItV per year 
Avcrap cost 
S40 066 (1995) 
$29 6SO (1997) 
S5OS-StOOO (1997) 
5418-.$837 (1997) 
$100 ? (1995) 
Pathotop:al gambJen -75% of total gambJiu.&fbaDkrupt problemlO 
Problem pmblaa - 2S% of total gamb1ingfbantruptc problcmlO 
Annual Ranp: ? 
Total new bankruptcy costs due to pat:ho1op:a1 gamblers, 1994-1997: ? 
Averqc cost Population Total new 
(adjustcd2 to creating new costs·· 
cummt $).. problem (1998) 
$29(j5O 
$505-51000 
5418-$837 
Note: Usually igoored by baDbuptcy attomcys, it was historicaDy RqUinId that anyone filing for bankra.ptcy indicate money 
and assets lost bccauIe of pmb.Iiq during the year, iDciudiDs 'dates, DIIImS, and places. and the amounts of money . .. lost'. 
11 U.S.C. Appcadix, Bankruptcy Rules. Form 7, in L NeIsoD Rose, Gambling and the Law 46 (1986). 
• Footnotes at cad of this Artidc. 
•• Numbers may cuiIy be adjusted to cum:at dollars by visiting the "Consumer Price Index (All Urban Coosumas)" of the 
U.S. BuRau of Labor Statistics at http://stats.bls.gov/ and utilizing the following formula ClUIDlPIc: 
CPI Current Year 
5 Former Year x CPI Former Year = $ Current Year 
Example: 166.6 (1999) 
54000000 (1983) x 99.6 (1983) 56690763 (1999) 
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Table A6*. Crime Costs**-Costs of 1.5 MiIHon New Pathological GambIers,I 1994-1997 (Fla. Gov's 
Off. Rep't & Division on AddictioJm, llarYard Medical School) 
Socio-economic costs category 
Probationl 
Community controll , 
Incarceration' (75'1/0 Average) 
Postsecondary release supervision' 
Total 
• Footnotes at end of this article . 
Average cost 
(~) 
SI624 
S858 
S19987 
5363 
$22 832 
Average cost 
(adjusted2 to 
current $) •• 
Population 
creating 
new problem 
1.5 million 
Total new 
costs·· 
S34.2 billion (1998) 
•• Numbers may easily be adjusted to current dollars by visiting the 'Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers)' of the 
U.S. BuRau of Labor Statistics at bttp:/Istats.bls.gov/ and utilizing the fonowing formula example: 
Example: 
CPI Current Year 
$ Former Year x CPI Former Year = S Current Year 
$4000000 (1983) x 166.6 (1999) $6690763 (1999) 
99.6 (1983) 
Table A7*. Crime CGSts**-Directly Because of Legalized GambIiDg, 1.5 MiDion People or O.5~. of 
U.s. PopuIatiaII BecaIDe New CrinIintIls in 3 Years from 1994-1997 (DmsioD on Addicticms, Hananl 
Meclical SdIooI)l 
Average cost 
(reported) 
Awrqe cost 
(acljuItecP to 
c:ummt $)*. 
Cumulative _ costs 
to U.S. taxpayers per 
year** (1998) 
Crime' &; nplatory costs" (adjusted to entiR population $8,OOO-+SI0000 
of pathoJoaicaI pmbIcrs per year~ 
S12 billion-Sl5 billion 
Average 8IDOI1DtlItoien an: Dot DIdudcd, since CCODOJDics 
arJIoIe these 81IIDUDtI an: DICR trImICers of wealth (but 
these 8ID01IIlts an: still transfers from the buaiDess 
COJDIDIIDity to the crimiDal ClQIDID1lDity) 
• Footnotes at cod of this a.rtide. 
$4 billion per year ... S5 
biJIion per year 
Comparison: total U.S. 
tu. RWlIl1JeS from 
pmbIiog=SI7.1 billion6 
.. Numbcn may easily be adjusted to curreDt dollars by YisitiDg the 'Ccmaumer Price IDctc:K (All Urban Consumers)' of the 
U.S. BUlau of Labor Statistics at http://stats.bis.gov/ aad utiliziug the foJlowiDg fODDWa c:umpJc: 
CPI Current Year 
S FOI1IIer Year x CPI Former y~ =$ Current Year 
166.6 (1999) 
$4000000 (1983»( 99.6 (1983) .. $6690763 (1999) 
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Table A8*. Crime Costs**-Partial (Incarceration) Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers,l 
1994-1997 
Socio-economic costs category 
80% Admit committing civil offenses3 
70% Steal for tIlODCY" 
100"10 (Lorenz, 1992)5 
61.SOA admit illegal ac:ts3 
44"10 stole from employer; 
37"/0 stole money3 
33% Wrote bad c:becIts3 
28% Delinquent in tax,eSl 
2SO/o Involved iIi auto aa:identsl 
47.3% admit speeding to gambJe3 
25% Indicted" 
2S01. (Lorenz, 1992)5 
18% gambling related arrests' 
20"10 Admit forgery3 
12.5% Serve tirJIe4 
Average cost Average cost 
(reported) (adjusted2 to 
current $) •• 
13%-ISOA (Lorenz)B 
20-30% prc-existing prisoners'" S20 2257 
pat.hoJosical gamblers9 (Looney, 1998) 
• Footnotes at end of this article. 
Population 
creating new 
problem lO 
Total new 
costs·· 
•• Numbers may eaaily be adjusted to current dollars by visiting the 'Consumer Price IDdeIt (All Urban Consumers)' of the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistica at http://stats.b1s.gov/ and utilizing the following formula example: 
CPI Current Year 
$ Former Year x CPI Former Year ... $ Current Year 
Example: 166.6 (1999) 
$4000000 (1983) x 99.6 (1983) ... 56690763 (1999) 
Table A'J*. AYeI'IIP Replatory and Comdioas Costs pel" Year Calculated 85 a Fuaction of the Total 
NanIber of Pathological Gauablers-
PoIiccjlegulatory ownight costs 
State potice2 
Local poticc/ftn:3 
lleguI&tory" 
ProIecutoriaI/iDcanleration costs 
District auomey$ 
Coststo~ 
White coDar c:rime r;oats7 
o--yMI' jixMJ t:D6tI 
Inte1'llllldilde iDc:aI"I:IntioDl 
New priIODa (fiud COlt)' 
LoDg-term iuwantion costs 
Slaooo-m000 (LooDay, 1997)10 
S2S 000 (Lonm, 19t2)11 
SlO 224.65 (ComIctioDs Ycarboot)12 
• FootDoteI at end of this article. 
$2100 per year 
+$1092 
$3192/Path. Gamb. 
Average cost 
(reported) 
$763 .... $1801 
S207 
SI018 .... $IS4S 
$291 .... $418 
SI91-$272 
$4123 per year 
$222S per year 
$8818 .... $10591 
AWlI"IlF cost (adjustedl 
to currmt $) •• 
.. NumbcIrs may eaaily be acljustecI to current dollars by visiting the 'Consumer Price IDdeIt (All UrbanCoDsumers)' of the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statiatics at http://stats.bls.gov/ and utilizing the following formula exampJe: 
CPI CuneDt Year 
$ Former Year x CPI Former Year ... S Current Year 
Example: 166.6 (1999) 
$4000000 (1983) x 99.6 (1983) '"" 56690763 (1999) 
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Table AI0*. Number of U.s. Pathological Gamblers and Problem Gamblers (Division on Addictions, 
Harvard Medical School)l 
Population base 1997 U.S. totals 
1997 Pathological gamblers 
Adults (> 20 years) Adolescents (10-19 years) 4.4 million 
2.2 million 2.2 million U.S. 1997268 million 
1997 Problem gamblers 
Adults (> 20 years) Adolescents (10-19 years) 
11 million 
5.3 million 5.7 million 
1997 Combined P&P 
Adults (> 20 years) Adolescents (10-19 years) 
15.4 million 
7.5 million 7.9 million 
Total: Range of estimates: 11.2 ..... 23 million 
Central estimate: 17.1 million 
• Footnotes at end of this article. 
Table All. Since 1991 Le2aIbed_ Gam~"as DestabiHzed the 'Readiness' of U.s. Military Personnel 
by a 66% Increase in Patbcilogical Gamhli 
Number of U.S 0.5 ..... 1.35% increase in pathological gamblers 2 ..... 5.6% increase in problem gamblers 
military personnel2 1994-1997 
2% Straight 0.5% Proportional Total·· 5.1% straight 2"10 Proportional Total·· 
(1991)1 inczease3 increase4 (1991)1 increase6 increase' 
1994-1997 1994-1997 1994-1997 1994-1997 
1.5 million 30000 7500 20250 78000' 30000 84000 
All patholosical and problem gamblers destabilize military 'readiness'. 
Nota Bene: SiDcc 1991, tbesc ~ have doubled. 
•• Numbers may easily be adjusted to c:urrent dollars by visiting the 'CoDsumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers)' of the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://staQ.bls.gov/ and utilizing the fonowing formula example: 
CPI Cummt Year 
5 Former Year x CPI Former Year = 5 Current Year 
Example: 166.6 (1999) 
$4000000 (1983) x 99.6 (1983) = $6690763 (1999) 
Table AI2*. AtIdictioas Costs**-Cests of 1.5 MiIIioa New Padaological Gamblersl 1994-1997 
IDsarance IDdustry 
Socio-economic costs category Average cost A~ cost Population Total DeW costs·· 
(mportcd) (adjusted2 to creating DeW 
current $)*.. problem 
47"10 Insurance fraud (3J-1a of total ins. fraud)l $65468 (1987) 
47% of male pathological pmblers 
32% false claim/auto aa:ideDt 
21% stoIcJins. co. paid 
16% false claim (DOt fircjtheft) 
15"1. fabd blqlaryJproperty theft 
15810 atqed claim (DOt firc,ltbeft) 
11% fIIIIIPl iDJprofited from arson 
80/0 caused lois to insurance co. 
80/0 c:ratcd/atqed accide:Dt 
52"/0 SurtmdenId po1iQes3 513200(1987) 
Health Coats 
Costs of Suicides 
• Footnotes at end of this article. 
$6.6 billion3•4 (Est. 1997) 
513.2 bi1lion3 (Est. 1997) 
•• Numbers may easily be adjusted to current dollars by visiting the 'Consumer Price Inde:lt (AU Urban Coosumers)' of 
the U.S. BURIIlu of Labor Statistics at http://stats.bJs.gov/ and uti1izing the following formula eumple: 
CPI Current Year 
5 Former Year x CP" F Y == 5 Current Year 
Example: ~ Ol'lllm' ear 
$4000000 (1983) x 1:': (~~:: == $6690763 (1999) 
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Table A13*. AddictiODS Costs**-Costs of 1.5 MilHon New Pathological Gamblers! 1994-1997 
Socio-economic costs category 
44% Steal from employer3 
34% Fired from or quit work3 
Ave. wap 533410 (Looney)" 
Ave. W&F $35000 (Minn. Rpt.)S 
26% Divorced or aeparatecf3 
59"10 CODIidered separating' 
26% Divorced or Separated" 
17"10 Divorced' 
10% Separated? 
• Footnotes at end of this article . 
Average 
cost 
Average cost 
(adjusted2 to 
current $) •• 
Population 
creating new 
problem 
Total new 
costs·· 
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•• Numbers may easily be adjusted to current dollars by visiting the 'Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers)' of the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://stats.bls.gov/ and utilizing the following formula example: 
CPI Current Year 
$ Former Year x CPI Fonner Year $ Current Year 
166.6 (1999) 
$4000000 (1983) x 99.6 (1983) $6690763 (1999) 
Example: 
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Table AI4*. Addictions Costs**-Costs of 1.5 Million New Pathological Gamblers,l 1994-1997 
Suicides 
Socio-economic cost category 
79% Wanted to die3 
66"10 Contemplated suicide4 
67% (Looney)3 
47.5% (Frank)S 
49% Had defmite plan to kill themselves4 
16% Had.attempted suicide4 
25% (Thompson) 
18% (Looney)l 
13% (Frank, Lester, & Wexler)S 
1.1% in general populations 
0.1% Completed suicides 
ID debt to business 
Ave. wage: lost productivity 
Average cost Average cost 
(reported) (adjusted to 
current $)2** 
$7526210 
$290009 
$283154 
$278SO' 
$2300()9 
5300007 
5334104 
535000s 
Population 
creating new 
problem 
Total new 
costs-* 
'IDCRaSe in leplized pmbling ... may be leading to a signifJCant increase in suicide rates among both residents of and 
visiton to communities where casinos are thriving .•• .' Study links suicide increase to gambling, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 
1997.11 
http://webscrvl.atartribune.com/cgi-bin/StOnLine/article?tbisSlug = suic16 > 
Of all deaths! 1 
Suicidu by out-of-state "mtors 
Nonpmbling commuuity 
0.97% 
- Footnotes at end of this article. 
Gambling communities 
4.28% (Las Vegas) 
2.31% (ReDo) 
1.87% (AUantic City) 
-- Numbers may easily be adjusted to c:urnmt dollan by viSiting the 'Consumer Price Index (All Urban Consumers)' of the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://stats.bJs.gov/ and utilizing the following formula example: 
CPI Cuncnt Year 
$ Former Year x CPI Former Year = 5 Cuncnt Year 
166.6 (1999) 
$4000000 (1983) x 99.6 (1983) = 56690763 (1999) 
Example: 
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Coasumer Price IDdex-AD UrhIIII Castomss* 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://stats.bls.govj) 
Jaa. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Au&. Sept. 
1971 39.8 39.9 40.0 40.1 40.3 40.6 40.7 40.8 40.8 
1972 41.1 41.3 41.4 41.5 41.6 41.7 41.9 ·42.0 42.1 
1973 42.6 42.9 43.3 43.6 43.9 44.2 44.3 45.1 45.2 
1974 46.6 47.2 47.8 48.0 48.6 49.0 49.4 SO.O 40.6 
1975 52.1 52.5 52.7 52.9 53.2 53.6 54.2 .54.3 54.6 
1976 55.6 55.8 55;9 56.1 56.5 56.8 57.1 57.4 57.6 
1977 58.5 59.1 59.5 60.0 60.3 60.7 61.0 61.2 61.4 
1978 62.5 62.9 63.4 63.9 64.5 65.2 65.7 66.0 66.5 
1979 68.3 69.1 69.8 70.6 71.5 72.3 73.1 73.8 74.6 
1910 77.8 78.9 80.1 81.0 81.8 82.7 82.7 83.3 84.0 
1911 87.0 87.9 88.5 89.1 89.8 90.6 91.6 92.3 93.2 
1912 94.3 94.6 94.5 94.9 95.8 97.0 97.5 97.7 97.9 
1983 97.8 97.9 97.9 98.6 99.2 99.5 99.9 100.2 100.7 
1914 101.9 102.4 102.6 103.1 103.4 103.7 104.1 104.5 105.0 
1985 IOS.5 106.0 106.4 106.9 107.3 107.6 107.8 IOS.0 IOS.3 
1986 109.6 109.3 IOS.8 IOS.6 IOS.9 109.5 109.5 109.7 110.2 
1917 111.2 111.6 112.1 112.7 113.1 113.5 113.8 114.4 115.0 
UII lIS.7 116.0 116.5 117.1 117.5 118.0 118.5 119.0 119.8 
1_ 121.1 121.6 122.3 123.1 123.8 124.1 124.4 124.6 125.0 
1". 127.4 121.0 128.7 128.9 129.2 129.9 130.4 131.6 132.7 
1"1 134.6 134.8 135.0 135.2 135.6 136.0 136.2 136.6 137.2 
Ut2 138.1 138.6 139.3 139.5 139.7 140.2 140.5 140.9 141.3 
1," 142.6 143.1 143.6 144.0 144.2 144.4 144.4 144.1 145.1 
1'" 146.2 146.7 147.2 147.4 147.5 141.0 148.4 149.0 149.4 
1"5 150.3 .150.9 151.4 151.9 152.2 152.5 152.5 152.9 153.2 
1'" 154.4 154.9 ISS.7 156.3 156.6 156.7 157.0 157.3 157.8 
I", 159.1 159.6 160.0 160.2 IeID.l 160.3 160.5 160.8 161.2 
1_ 161.6 161.9 162.2 162.5 161.8 163.0 163.2 163.4 163.6 
.", 164.3 164.5 165.0 166.2 166.2 166.2 166.7 167.1 167.9 
2MO 168.7 169.7 171.1 171.2 171.3 172.3 172.6 172.7 
• To update to CU1'J'III1t dollars the following formula eumple should be uti1i7.ed: 
CPI Current Year 
$ Fonner Year x CPI Former Year =$ Current Year 
Example: 166.6 (1999) 
$4000000 (1983) x 99.6 (1983) =$6690763 (1999) 
VISit http://stats.bls.gov/ to update this table. 
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Oct. NO\'. Dec. AImual 
40.9 40.9 41.1 40.5 
42.3 42.4 42.5 41.8 
45.6 45.9 46.2 44.4 
51.1 51.5 51.9 49.3 
54.9 55.3 55.5 53.8 
57.9 58.0 58.2 56.9 
61.6 61.9 62.1 60.6 
. 67.1 67.4 67.7 65.2 
75.2 75.9 76.7 72.6 
84.8 85.5 86.3 82.4 
93.4 93.7 ·94.0 90.0 
98.2 98.0 97.6 96.5 
101.0 101.2 101.3 .99.6 
IOS.3 105.3 105.3 103.9 
IOS.7 109.0 109.3 107.6 
110.3 110.4 110.5 .109.6 
115.3 115.4 115.4 113.6· 
120.2 120.3 120.5 118.3 
125.6 125.9 126.1 124.0 
133.5 133.8 133.8 130.7 
137.4 137.8 137.9 136.2 
141.8 142.0 -141.9 1110.3 
145.7 145.8 145.8 144.5 
149.5 149.7 149.7 148.2 
153.7 153.6 153.5 152.4 
ISS.3 ISS.6 lSB.6 156.9 
161.6 161.5 . 161.3 160.5 
164.0 164.0 163.9 163.0 
168.2 168.3 168.3 166.6 
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Footnotes for Table At 
1. U.S. Bur. Census, U.S. Dep't Com. (1997). 
2. Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical Sch., 
Estimating the Prevalence of Disordered Gam-
bling Behavior in the United States and 
Canada: A Meta-analysis, at 43, Table 13 
(Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, & Joni 
Vander Bilt, Dec. 15, 1997) [hereinafter Har-
vard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press Re-
lease of Harvard Medical Sch., 'Harvard 
Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence 
of Gambling Disorders in North America', 
Dec. 4, 1997 (From 0.84%, 'the prevalence rate 
[for pathological gamblers] for 1994-1997 
grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population'.). 
Since the Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis 
did not include the calculations for essential 
elements, some reasonable estimates and con-
clusions consistent with the data need to be 
drawn. 
3. Multiplying the prevalence percentage of 
0.84% for 1994 with the yearly population 
number from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
yields this baseline number of 'pathological 
gamblers' for 1994. Using the classic standard 
baseline of 0.71% established by the 1976 U.S. 
Commission on Gambling (which resulted in 
an estimated 1.1 million pathological gamblers 
in 1976), there would be a 0.52% increase in 
pathological gamblers from. 1994 to 1997. U.S. 
Comm'n on the Rev. of a Nat'l Pot'y Toward 
Gambling, Gambling in America 73 (U.S. 
Gov't Printing Off. 1976) [hereinafter U.S. 
Comm'n on Gambling). 
4. Without showing c:ak:ulations, Table 16 of the 
Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis gives 4.4 
million pathological gamblers in 1997, with a 
range between 2.9 and 5.8 million. Harvard 
Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 2, at 51, 
Table 16. 
5. Multiplying the prevalencle percentage for 
1997 with the yearly population number from 
the U.S . .Bureau of the CeDsus yields 3.5 mil-
lion for an increase of 1.3 million new patho-
logical gamblers. However, the Harvard 
Addictions Meta-analysis concludes that there 
were 4.4 million pathological gamblers in 
1997, which would yield 1.3-2.2 million new 
pathological gamblers. Since the Harvard Ad-
dictions Meta-analysis did not include its cal-
culations, 1.5 million new pathological 
Copyright C 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
gamblers is conservative. Harvard Addictions 
Meta-analysis, supra note 2, at 43, Table 13 & 
51, Table 16. 
6. Experts estimating just the 'partial' costs per 
year of a pathological gambler range from 
$10000 (Thompson, 1997) to over $60000 
(politzer, Better Gov't Assoc. Chi.; adjusted 
for inflation). A fairly conservative $15000 per 
year is utilized at this juncture. Since in 1998 
the average salary was approximately $30000 
per year and since by definition pathological 
gamblers lose their productivity, the cost of 
$15000 per year is quite reasonable. U.S. Bur. 
Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor (1997). 
7. Medical Marijuana Referenda in America: 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 
1st Sess. (Oct. 1, 1997) (Statement of General 
Barry R. McCaffrey, Dir., U.S. Off. of Nat'} 
Drug Control Policy). 
FootDotes for Table A2 
1. U.S. Bur. Census, U.S. Dep't Com. (1997). 
2. Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical Sch., 
Estimating the Prevalence of Disordered Gam-
bling Behavior in the United States and 
Canada: A Meta-analysis, at 43, Table 13 
(Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, & Joni 
Vander Bilt, Dec. IS, 1997) [hereinafter Har-
vard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press Re-
lease of Harvard Medical Sch., 'Harvard 
Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence 
of Gambling Disorders in North America', 
Dec. 4, 1997 (From 0.840/0, 'the prevalence rate 
[for pa.thoJogical gamblers] for 1994-1997 
grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population' .). 
Since the Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis 
did not include the calculations for essential 
elements, some reasonable estimates and con-
clusions consistent with the data need to be 
drawn. 
3. Multiplying the prevalence percentage of 
2.93% for 1994 with the yearly population 
number from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 
yields this baseline number of 'problem gam-
blers' for 1994. Using the classic standard 
baseline of 2.33% established by the 1976 U.S. 
Commission on Gambling would yield a 
2.55% increase in problem gamblers from 1994 
to 1997. U.S. Comm'n on the Rev. of a Nat'l 
Pol'y Toward Gambling, Gambling in 
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America 73 (U.S. Gov't Printing Off. 1976) 
[hereinafter U.S. Comm'n on Gambling]. 
4. Without showing calculations, Table 16 of the 
Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis gives 11 
million problem gamblers in 1997, with a 
range between 7.1 and 14.9 million. Harvard 
Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 2, at 51, 
Table 16. 
5. Multiplying the prevalence percentage for 
1997 with the yearly population number from 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census yields 13 mil-
lion for an increase of 5.4 million new problem 
gamblers. However, the Harvard Addictions 
Meta-analysis concludes that there were 11 
million problem gamblers in 1997, which 
would yield 3.4-5.4 million new problem gam-
blers. Since the Harvard Addictions Meta-
analysis did not include its calculations, 3.5 
million new problem gamblers is conservative. 
Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis, supra note 
2, at Tables 13, 16. 
6. A socio-economic cost figure of $5000 per 
problem gambler per year is probably too 
conservative considering that the average 
problem gambler is earning well over the aver-
age 1997 annual salary of approximately 
$30000 per year which is further increased 
since most problem gamblers are super-achiev-
ers, Type-A personalities. For a costs table 
see, John W. Kindt, The Economic Impacts of 
Legalized Gambling Activities, 43 Drake L. 
Rev. 51, 90-91, Table 3 (1994). 
7. Medical Marijuana Referenda in America: 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 
Ist Sess. (Oct. I, 1997) (Statement of General 
Barry R. McCaffrey, Dir., U.S. Off. of Nat') 
Drug Control Policy). 
FootDDtes for TUie A3 
1. U.S. Bur. Census, U.S. Dep't Com. (1997). 
2. Div. Addictions, Harvard Medical School, Es-
timating the Prevalence of Disordered Gam-
bling Behavior in the United States and 
Canada' A Meta-analysis, at 43, Table 13 cl 
51, Table 16 (Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. 
Hall, & Joni Vander Bilt. Dec. IS, 1997) 
[hereinafter Harvard Addictions Meta-analy-
sis]; Press Release of Harvard Medical School, 
'Harvard Medical School Researchers Map 
Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North 
Copyright C> 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
America', Dec. 4, 1997 (From 0.84% in 1993 
'the prevalence rate for 1994-1997 grew to 
1.29 percent of the adult population'.) 
[hereinafter Harvard Division on Addictions 
Press Release]. 
3. [d. 
4. The National Impact Of Casino Gambling Pro-
liferation: Hearing before the House Comm. on 
Small Business, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) 
(statement of Prof. John W. Kindt) ($13000-
52000 per pathological gambler in 1994) 
[hereinafter Congressional Gambling Hearing 
1994]. With regard to 1.5 million new patho-
logical g3m.blers the costs would be $19.5-78 
billion before adjusting to 1997 dollars. 
S. Public Memorandum, 'Harvard Study', Prof. 
William Thompson, UNLV, Dec. 6,1997. Us-
ing an estimated population base of 200 mil-
lion, Prof. Thompson calculates 2.6 million 
total pathological gamblers at a 'low' cost of 
$9400 per year equals $24 billion per year. 
Adjusted for a population rate of the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census at 268 million, the num-
bers are 3.5 million total pathological gam-
blers at $9400 per year equals $33 billion per 
year. 'Now actually the $9400 figure is a low 
one; I have not seen a lower one', according to 
Professor Thompson. Id. '[A]PPly Thompson's 
... numbers to the Harvard University estimate 
of the entire number of ... (pathological] gam-
blers in the United States, that's a $40 billion 
price tag, more than double the $16.8 billion 
in taxes ... from legalized. gambling'. Jim Nes-
bitt, Costs of gambling might be economic as 
well as socilll, Detroit Free Press, Apr. 5, 1998, 
at AI, A4 [hereinafter Costs of gambling]. By 
comparison, Harvard Division on Addictions 
reports 4.4 million total pathological gamblers 
and at Thompson's figure of $9400 per year, 
this equals $41 billion. Harvard Addictions 
Meta-analysis, supra note 2, at 51, Table 16. 
6. Am. Medical Assoc., House of Delegates Res-
olution 430 (A-94) (1994). 
7. Costs of gambling, supra note 5, at A4. 
8. During at least one conference's panel discus-
sion, William Eactington of the University of 
Nevada at Reno declined to estimate the so-
cio-economic costs associated with pathologi-
cal gamblers. When challenged by Tom Grey, 
the Executive Director of the National Coali-
tion Against Legalized Gambling, Eadington 
refused to give any estimates or numbers. 
Manage. Decis. Econ. 2l: 17-63 (2001) 
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Panel of the 'Impact of Legalized Gambling 
on Historic Communities', 50th Nat'l Preser-
vation Conf., Nat'} Trust for Historic Preser-
vation, Chicago, TIl., Oct. 18, 1996. 
Tom Grey was incredulous that Eadington 
and the University of Nevada had been study-
ing gambling over 20 years and yet Eadington 
'could not even estimate the cost of a patho-
logical gambler'. ld. (exchange between 
William Eadington, Dir., Inst. for the Study of 
Gambling and Commercial Gaming, Univ. 
Nev.-Reno, and Tom Grey, Exec. Dir., Nat'l 
Coalition Against Legalized Gambling). 
In 1999 even after the conclusion of the 1999 
National Gambling Impact Study Commis-
sion, Eadington was still declining to report 
any numbers involving social costs or to give 
any estimates. Question and Answer Panel 
Discussion with William Eadington, Conf. on 
'Betting on the Future: Taking Gaming and 
the Law into the 21st Century', Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law, Nov. 15-16, 1999 
[hereinafter Cardozo Law School Conf., Panel 
Discussion]. 
9. Alcohol & Drug Abuse Admin., Md. Dep't 
Health & Mental Hygiene, Task Force on 
Gambling Addiction in Maryland 59-61 (Va-
lerie C. Lorenz & Robert M. Politzer, C0-
chairs 1990). '[A]t an average cost of $30000, 
pathological gambling cost society about S80 
billion in 1988'. Id. at 59. In 1997 dollars, the 
average cost would be approximately $40000 
with total U.S. socio-economic costs of SUp 
billion. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't 
Labor 1997 (for 1997 dollar estimates). 
FootDotes for Table A4 
1. The calculation of 0.5% of the U.S. popula-
tion or 1.5 million new pathological (ad-
dicted) gamblers created by Jcgalized 
gambling between 1994 and 1997 comes 
from: Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical 
School, Estimating the Prevalence of Disor-
dered Gambling Behavior in the United 
States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, at 43, 
Table 13 & 51, Table 16 (Howard J. Shaffer, 
Matthew N. Hall, & Joni Vander Bilt, Dec. 
15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions 
Meta-analysis]; see Press Release of Harvard 
Medical Sch., 'Harvard Medical School Re-
searchers Map Prevalence of Gambling Dis-
orders in North America', Dec. 4, 1997 
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(From 0.84%, 'the prevalence rate [for patho-
logical gambling] for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 
percent of the adult population'.). 
2. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor 
(1997). 
3. 'Measuring the Costs of Pathological Gam-
bling', Address by Prof. Henry Lesieur, Ill. 
St. U., at the Nat'} Conf. on Gambling Be-
hav., Nat'l Coun. on Problem Gambling, 
Chi., 111., Sept. 3-5, 1996. The sample group 
consists of pathological gamblers. 
4. SMR Research Corp., The Personal 
Bankruptcy Crisis, 1997, 118 (1997) (commis-
sioned by the banking/credit community, 
Am. Bankers Assoc.) [hereinafter Bankruptcy 
Crisis]; Business Wire, New national study 
shows correlation between gambling growth 
and the significant rise in personal bankrupt-
cies, Business Wire Features, June 27, 1997 
[hereinafter Correlation between gambling 
growth and bankruptCies]. The sample group 
consists of pathological gamblers. 
5. These costs are passed along to consumers. 
Bankruptcy Crisis, supra note 4, at 118. The 
Gamblers Anonymous (G.A.) mean average 
lifetime debt was 5215406 but since current 
activity is more relevant to the present analy-
sis the G.A. mean average current debt of 
$113640 is utilized. See, id. The amounts 
given for 'problem gamblers' in the report 
(on page 119) should not be confused with 
the amounts for GA. members which equate 
to pathologiccil gamblers. Id. at 118-119. 
6. Id. at 124. 
7. These costs are passed along to consumers. 
See generally, ill. at 116-130. See also Co"e-
lation between gambling growth and bankrupt-
des, supra note 4. 
8. WEFA Group, The Financial Costs of Per-
sonal Bankruptcy, at 1, 15, 19 (Feb. 1998) 
[hereinafter Costs of Bankruptcy]. 
9. See Ricardo Gaze!, Dan Rickman, &. William. 
N. Thompson, 'Casino Gambling As An 
Economic Development Tool: Export Activ-
ity-Import Substitution Or Business Canni-
balization And Perverse Income Re-
distribution? the Evidence From Wisconsin', 
paper presented to the W. Regional Sci. As-
soc., 35th Ann. Mt'g, Napa, Ca., Feb. 28, 
1996 (backgroUnd research raised the admin-
istrative cost issue of bankruptcies). 
10. Bankruptcy Crisis, supra note 4, at 123-124. 
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11. Correlation between gambling growth and 
bankruptcies, supra note 4. Costs of Bank-
ruptcy, supra note 8, at 19 (total costs $44.3 
billion and 1.33 million total filings). 
12. See Bankruptcy Crisis, supra note 4, at 123-
124. 
Footnotes for Table AS 
1. The calculation of 21'10 of the U.S. population 
or 3.5 million new problem gamblers created 
by legalized gambling between 1994 and 1997 
comes from: Div. on Addictions, Harvard 
Medical School, Estimating the Prevalence of 
Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United 
States and Canada: A Meta-analysis, at 43, 
Table 13 & 51, Table 16 (Howard J. Shaffer, 
Matthew N. Hall, & Joni Vander Bilt, Dec. 
15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions 
Meta-analysis]; see Press Release of Harvard 
Medical Sch., 'Harvard Medical School Re-
searchers Map Prevalence of Gambling Dis-
orders in North America', Dec. 4, 1997 
(From 0.84%, 'the prevalence rate [for patho-
logical gambling] for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 
percent of the adult population'.). 
2. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor 
(1997). 
3. To be extremely conservative, 10% is used 
instead of 31%. 
4. SMR Research Corp., The Personal 
Bankruptcy Crisis, 1997, 119 (1997) (commis-
sioned by the bankingfcredit community, 
Am. Bankers Assoc.) [hereinafter Bankruptcy 
Crisis). Federal regulations require that 
bankruptcy cases must report the impact of 
gambling losses on the bankruptcy filing, but 
this requirement is often forgotten. However, 
SMR Research COnf1I1llS a 1995 Minnesota 
study where 52% of bankruptcy filers claimed 
gambling losses, and the average total debt 
was $40066 which surpassed their average 
annual income of $35244 (but perhaps not all 
of this debt should be attributed to gam-
bling). Professor Lesieur reported that at 
least 21% of pathological gamblers file for 
bankruptcy. This conclusion would be a rea-
sonable conjecture when credit card debt (the 
second leading cause of bankruptcies) is fac-
tored into the analysis. This is also consistent 
with the casinos' reporting that 40-60% of 
the money wagered is not carried onto the 
Copyright C 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
premises and suggesting that ATMs and 
credit be readily supplied to players; for ex-
ample, including credit card machines di-
rectly at the card tables as approved by New 
Jersey regulators in September of 1996. Id. at 
127; Robyn Taylor Farets, Cash advances, 
Int'l Gaming & Wagering Bus., Sept. 1996, at 
S8 (,In fact, about 40% to 60% of the cash 
now wagered in a casino is not carried onto 
the property in customer wallets ... .'). SMR 
Research concluded in 1997 that legalized 
gambling: (1) was the fourth leading cause of 
bankruptcies, (2) was the fastest growing 
cause, (3) carried a 'hidden cost' per house-
hold of $408, and (4) carried a U.S. total cost 
of $40 billion per year. See generally, 
Bankruptcy Crisis, infra, at 116-130; Busi-
ness Wire, New national study shows cor-
relation between gambling growth and the 
significant rise in personal bankruptcies, 
Business Wire Features, June 26, 1997 
[hereinafter Correlation between gambling 
growth and bankruptcieS]. Another survey by 
the University of Minnesota Medical School 
in April 1996 found results which roughly 
paralleled the 1995 Minnesota study, but the 
1996 survey does not appear to distinguish as 
speciflCally the results in categories differenti-
ating between pathological and problem 
gamblers. Id. at 119. 
5. See generally, Bankruptcy Crisis, supra note 
4, at 116-130. See also Co"elation between 
gambling growth and bankruptcies, supra note 
4. 
6. WEF A Group, The Financial Costs of Per-
sonal Bankruptcies, at I, IS, 19 (Feb. 1998) 
[hereinafter Costs of Bankruptcy). 
7. See Ricardo Gazel, Dan Rickman, & William 
N. Thompson. <Casino Gambling As An 
Economic Development Tool: Export Activ-
ity-Import Substitution Or Business Canni-
balization And Perverse Income Re-
distribution? the Evidence From WISCOnsin', 
paper presented to the W. Regional Sci. As-
SOC., 35th Ann. Mt'g, Napa. Ca., Feb. 28, 
1996 (background research raised the admin-
istrative cost issue of bankruptcies). 
8. Bankruptcy Crisis. supra note 4, at 123-124. 
9. Co"elation between gambling growth and 
bankruptcies, supra note 4. 
10. See Bankruptcy Crisis, supra note 4. at 123-
124. 
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Footnotes for Table A6 
1. The calculation of 0.5% of the U.S. population 
or 1.5 million new pathological (addicted) 
gamblers created by legalized gambling be-
tween 1994 and 1997 comes from: Div. on 
Addictions, Harvard Medical School, Estimat-
ing the Prevalence of Disordered Gambling 
Behavior in the United States and Canada: A 
Meta-analysis, at 43, Table 13" 51, Table 16 
(Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, "Joni 
Vander Bilt, Dec. IS, 1997) [hereinafter Har-
vard Addictions Meta-analysis); see Press Re-
lease of Harvard Medical Sch., 'Harvard 
Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence 
of Gambling Disorders in North Ainerica', 
Dec. 4, 1997 (From 0.84%, 'the prevalence rate 
[for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 
grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population'.). 
2. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor 
(1991). 
3. Fla. Gov. Off., Casinos in Florida: An Analy-
sis of the Economic and Social Impacts 12 
(1994). 
Footnotes for Table A7 
1. The calculation of 0.5% of the U.S. population 
or 1.5 million new pathological (addicted) 
gamblers created by legalized. gambling be-
tween 1994 and 1991 comes from: Div. on 
Addictions, Harvard Medical School, Estimat-
ing the Prevalence of Disordered Gambling 
Behavior in the United States and Canada: A 
Meta-aDalysis, at 43, Table 13 " 51, Table 16 
(Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, " Joni 
Vander Bilt, Dec. 15, 1997) [hcn:inafter Har-
vard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press Re-
lease of Harvard Medical Sch., 'Harvard 
Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence 
of Gambling Disorders in North America', 
Dec. 4, 1991 (From 0.84%, 'the prevalence rate 
[for pathological gambling] for 1994-1997 
grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population'.). 
2. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor 
(1997). 
3. According to the authoritative Compulsive 
Gambling Center in Baltimore, Maryland, vir-
tually all pathological gamblers commit crimes 
(one Australian study concludes 7()Dfo), but 
only 12.5-15% are incarcerated. Most patho-
logical gamblers commit multiple property-
acquisition crimes. Therefore, over 1.5 million 
Copyright C 2001 John Wiley" Sons, Ltd. 
new crimes were committed from 1994 to . 
1997. 
4. See detailed chart on 'Average Regulatory and 
Corrections Costs', infra. For the most au-
thoritative report in this issue area, see Fla. 
Off. Gov., Casinos in Florida: An Analysis of 
the Economic and Social Impacts 61-76 
(1994). 
5. Obviously, every pathological gambler does 
not initially commit a property-acquisition 
crime in every year, but by defmition, patho-
logical gamblers will eventually engage in such 
crimes, although these crimes are often over-
looked by family members and close associ-
ates. See, e.g., the citations in John W. Kindt, 
Increased Crime and Legalizing Gambling Ac-
tivities: The Impacts on the Socio-Economics of 
Business and Government, 30 Crim. L. Bull. 
538, 550-552 (1994). 
6. Int1 Gaming" Wagering Bus. (Survey 1997). 
Footnotes for Table AS 
1. The calculation of 0.5% of the U.S. popula-
tion or 1.5 million new pathological (ad-
dicted) gamblers created by legalized 
gambling between 1994 and 1991 comes 
from: Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical 
School, Estimating the Prevalence of Disor-
dered Gambling Behavior in the United 
States and Canada' A Meta-analysis, at 43, 
Table 13 &; 51, Table 16 (Howard J. ShafTer, 
Matthew N. Hall, " Joni Vander Bilt, Dec. 
15, 1997) [hereinafter Harvard Addictions 
Meta-analysis); see Press Release of Harvard 
Medical Sch., 'Harvard Medical School Re-
searchers Map Prevalc:nce of Gambling Dis-
orders in North America', Dec. 4, 1991 
(From 0.840/0. 'the prevalence rate [for patho-
logical gambling] for 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 
percent of the adult population'.). 
2. U.S. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor 
(1997). 
3. Alcohol &; Drug Abuse Admin., Md. Dep't 
Health &:. Mental Hygiene, Task Force on 
Gambling Addiction in Maryland 61 (Valerie 
C. Lorenz " Robert M. Politzer, Co-chairs 
1990) [hereinafter Maryland Report). 
4. Australian Study reported at 10th Int' Conf. 
on Gambling & Risk Taking, Montreal, 
Canada, May 31-June 4, 1997. For more 
detailed analyses, see, e.g., Henry Lesieur, 
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Compulsive Gambling: Documenting the So-
cial and Economics Costs, Table 2, at 21 
(1991), published in part as Henry Lesieur, 
Compulsive Gambling, Society, May-June 
1992, at 42. See also Henry Lesieur & Ken-
neth Puig, Insurance Problems and Pathologi-
cal Gambling, 3 J. Gambling Behav. 123 
(1987). 
5. According to the Compulsive Gambling Cen-
ter, virtually all pathological gamblers 
commit crimes, but generally, 75% of 
pathological gamblers are not caught or the 
criminal char8es are dropped. This latter situ-
ation is usually because pathological gam-
blers initially commit their crimes against 
family members or close associates. Interview 
with Dr. Valerie Lorenz, Exec. Dir., Compul-
sive Gambling etr., Inc., Baltimore, Md., 
Dec. 10, 1992 [hereinafter cited as Lorenz 
Interview]; Maryland Report, supra note 3, 
at 28. For general discussions of the interface 
between compulsive gambling and resultant 
criminal behavior, see Brown, Pathological 
Gambling and Associated Patterns of Crime: 
Comparisons With Alcohol and Other Drug 
Addictions, 3 J. Gambling Behav. 98 (1987); 
Henry R. Lesieur, Gambling, Pathological 
Gambling, and Crime, in The Handbook of 
Pathological Gambling (T. Galski ed. 1987). 
See generally J. Livingston, Compulsive 
Gamblers: Observations on Action and Ab-
stinence (1974); Henry R. Lesieur, Female 
Pathological Gamblers and Crime, iri Gam-
bling Behavior and Problem Gambling 495 
(1993) {hereinafter Gamblers and Crime]. See 
generally, John W. Kindt, Increased Crime 
and Legalizing Gambling Operations: The Im-
pact on the Socio-Economics of Business and 
Government, 30 Crim. L. Bull. 538, 550-552 
nn.61-69 (1994). 
6. 'Measuring the Costs of Pathological Gam-
bling', Address by Prof. Henry Lesieur, DI. 
St. U., at the Nat'l Conf. on Gambling Be-
havior, Nat'] Coun. on Problem Gambling, 
Chicago, DI., Sept. 3-5, 1996 {hereinafter 
cited as 'Measuring the Costsl 
7. Crim. Justice Inst., The Corrections Year-
book 1997, 223 (eds. Cami1e Graham Camp 
& George M. Camp 1997). 
8. Lorenz Interview, supra note 5; John W. 
Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized 
Gambling Activities, 43 Drake L. Rev. 51, 94 
Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
n.285 (1994) (referencing Dr. Valerie Lorenz, 
Compulsive Gambling Ctr.); see Maryland 
Report, supra note 3, at 28. 'Research on the 
connection between pathological gambling 
and crime is still in its infancy'. Gamblers and 
Crime, supra note 5, at 495. 
9. N.J. Coun. on Compulsive Gambling, Leg-
islative Guide For Responsible Gaming In 
Your State 2 (Jan. 25, 1997). 
10. Of 1.5 million new pathological gamblers, 
this analysis reduces to 6.25% the lowest 
expert rate of those gamblers who serve time 
which is 12.5%. This extremely conservative 
estimate would indicate that 93750 new 
pathological gamblers served time between 
1994 and 1997 (or an additional 31250 pris-
oners per year). 
FootDotes for Table A9 
1. Bur. Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't Labor 
(1997). 
2. To provide 'before' and 'after' estimates of 
the impact of pervasive legalized gambling 
activities, this range of costs was extrapolated 
from DIinois analyses which were subjected 
to in-depth academic and public scrutiny. 
See, e.g., Speech by Terrance W. Gainor, 
Dir. DI. St. Police, at the Ann. IAODAPCA 
Luncheon, May 8, 1992, at 10 (for 'police 
services alone') [hereinafter cited as Dir. lli. 
St. Police]; Chicago Crime Comm'n, Analysis 
of Key Issues Involved in the Proposed 
Chicago Casino Gambling Project 21 (1992). 
The range of projected increases to the bud-
get of the Illinois state police was between 
$42 and 100 million, but since the Director 
frequently utilized the more cautious estimate 
of SI00 million, this is the estimate utilized. 
Although delimited in budgetary terms, these 
estimates apparently parallel the $41-100 
million increased costs calculated by interfac-
ing 'the incidence of index crime and the 
subsequent cost to the criminal system to 
handle those crimes'. m. Crim. Just. Info. 
Authority, Casino Gambling and Crime in 
Chicago 46 (1992) [hereinafter cited as Crim. 
Just. Info.]. These cost estimates did not in-
clude increased costs for (1) regulation; (2) 
victimization impact; (3) prosecution of orga-
nized crime; (4) additional facilities for sys-
tem workload; or (5) 'response to non-index 
crimes, such as DUI, fraud, extortion, 
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embezzlement, prostitution, and drug of-
fenses'. Crim. Just. Info., infra, at 46 & 47. 
See also Ill. Crim. Just. Info. Authority, Riv-
erboat Gambling and Crime in lllinois 2, 3 
(1994) (referencing the $41-1()() million in 
costs as specifically related to 'Chicago'). The 
lack of uniform categories of costs in many 
reports makes comparisons difficult. 
Government policymakers frequently argue 
that the burden of proof should be on the 
le~ gambling interests to refute any 
cauti()US projections by state agencies - par-
ticularly law enforcement agencies. On the 
other hand, proponents of increased legalized 
gambling activities often argue that law en-
forcement bureaucracies tend to inflate the 
costs to the criminal justice system to in-
crease their budgets. See generally, John W. 
Kindt, Increased Crime and Legalizing Gam-
bling Operations: The Impact on the Socio-
Economics of Business and Government, 30 
Crim. L. Bull. 538, 539, nn.2-3, 546 n.42 
(1994) (hereinafter Increased Crime and Le-
galizing Gambling]. See generally m. St. Po-
lice, Div. Crim. Investigation, Intelligence 
Bur., How Casino Gambling Affects Law En-
forcement (Apr. 16, 1992) [hereinafter cited as 
m. St. Police Report]. The laundering of 
money by legalized gambling operations ap-
pears to be a common problem. During 1992, 
for example, 'Atlantic City's casinos ... 
[were] under investigation for laundering 
drug money'. Roeser, Chicago Casino Plan 
Gambles City Future, Wall S1. J., Aug. 12, 
1992, at AIO (hereinafter cited as Roeser]. 
Less than two years after being initiated, the 
Illinois State Police Director, Terrance 
Gainor, reported that investigations were 'be-
ing conducted into suspected laundering of 
illegal drug profits through the riverboats' in 
Illinois. Urbanek, Probe Creating Fears for 
Riverboats' Image, Daily Herald (Arlington 
Heights, m.), Nov. 21, 1992, § 1. at 4; Laun-
dering on Riverboats, News-Sun (Waukegan, 
m.), Nov. 20, 1992, at 1. 
For analyses by the Chicago Crime C0mmis-
sion opposing the introduction of land-based 
casino gambling to Chicago, see Report of the 
Chicogo Crime Commission on Organized 
Crime in Chicago (J. Conlon, Pres. 1990). For 
analyses by the N.Y. Attorney General's of-
fice opposing the introduction of land-based 
Copyright C 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
casino gambling to New York State, see R. 
Abrams, Report of Attorney General Robert 
Abrams in Opposition to Legalized Casino 
Gambling in New York State (May 1981). For 
analyses of the impacts of land-based casino 
gambling on Atlantic City,New Jersey, see 
O'Brien & Flaherty, Regulation of the At-
lantic City Casino Industry and Attempts to 
Controls Its Infiltration by Organized Crime, 
16 Rutgers L.J. 721 (1985). 
. For examples of the parallel costs of patho-
logical gambling activities and other medical 
treatment costs (such as for alcoholics), see 
Politzer, Morrow, & Leavey, Report on the 
Societal Cost of Pathological Gambling and 
the Cost-Benefit/Effectiveness of Treatment 
(5th Nat'l Conf. on Gambling and Risk Tak-
ing 1981) [hereinafter cited as Politzer, Mor-
row, & Leavey]. 'Studies demonstrate that 
there is a high degree of overlap among 
pathological gambling, alcoholism and drug 
addiction'. Lesieur, Female Pathological 
Gamblers and Crime, in Gambling Behavior 
and Problem Gambling 495, 497 (1993) 
[hereinafter cited as Gamblers and Crime]. 
3. To provide a 'before' and 'after' estimate, 
these local police and fire costs were extrapo-
lated from the conservative estimates pre-
pared by proponents themselves of a 
$2-billion casino complex for Chicago. 
See Chicago Gaming Commission, Economic 
and Other Impacts of a Proposed Gaming, 
Entertainment and Hotel Facility 236-241 
(May 19, 1992) (report prepared by Deloitte 
& Touche, Chicago, ID.) (hereinafter cited as 
Proposed Gaming Facility Report]. Editorial, 
Economically, casinos are a good bet, Chicago 
Tribune, May 24, 1992, § 4, at 2 [hereinafter 
cited as Economically]. 'Deloitte & Touche 
also projects the loss of 2300 jobs and $126 
million in sales downstate, $65 million in 
casino regulatory costs and $11.4 million in 
annual costs for police and fire protection'. 
Id. at 2. For the actual estimates, see Pro-
posed Gaming Facility Report, infra, at 234-
245. For a comparison of the administrative 
costs of state lotteries, see DeBoer, The Ad-
ministrative Costs of SlfJIe Lotteries, 38 Nat'! 
Tax J. 479 (1985). 
4. The low-range regulatory costs were aver-
aged and extrapolated from the costs per 
year for New Jersey casino regulator efforts. 
The high-range estimate was a 1989 estimate 
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by Professor William Thompson given in the 
context of regulating future casinos. For a 
continuum of New Jersey regulatory costs, 
see seriatim editions of St. N.J., Comprehen-
sive Annual Financial Report. Compare, id. 
with the 1992 estimates of Increased Crime 
and Legalizing Gambling, supra note 2, at 
545-546. See, e.g., St. N.J., Comprehensive 
Annual Financial Report 238 (1992) ($56-57 
million for casino regulatory costs); N.J. 
Casino Control Comm'n, 1992 Annual Re-
port 23 (1992) ($57 million for casino regula-
tory costs in 1992, $62 million in 1991). 
Slight decreases in regulatory costs may oc-
cur over time. See, e.g., N.J. Governor's Adv. 
Comm'n on Gambling, Report and Recom-
mendations 65 (1988) ($66.4 million regula-
tory costs and 1,362 regulatory employees in 
1986 for 'all' gambling activities, and $76.6 
million regulatory costs in 1987); see N.J. St. 
Budget, FY 1986-1987; N.J. St. Budget, FY 
1991-1992. See also, Roeser, note 2 supra, at 
10 ($59 million for casino regulatory costs in 
1992). In 1989, the regulatory costs for At-
lantic City were also estimated at $85 million 
per year. Statement of William Thompson, 
Prof. Mg't & Pub. Admin., UNLV, before 
the Ill. Sen. Comm. regarding S.B. 572 on 
Riverboat Gambling, Sept. 27, 1989. See gen-
erally Lee & Che1ius, Government Regulation 
of Labor-Management Corruption: The 
Casino Industry Experience in New Jersey, 42 
Indus. & Lab. ReI. Rev. 436 (1989); TIL St. 
Police Report, note 2 supra. 
5. Timothy P. Ryan. Patricia Connor, & Janet 
F. Speyrer, The Impact of Casino Gambling 
in New Orleans 46-47 (1990) [hereinafter 
Gambling Impact in New Orleans]. These 
calculations were apparently analyzed and 
considered to be 'balanced' and valid. Robert 
Goodman, Legalized Gambling As A Strat-
egy For Economic Development 85-87 (Ctr. 
for &on. Dev., U. Mass.-Amherst 1994); ru. 
St. Police Report, note 2 supra, at 9; Dir. ru. 
St. Police, note 2 supra, at 9-10. These costs 
do not include many 'indirect costs' to the 
criminal justice system. For analyses of other 
'criminal law' issues, see generally Gaines, 
Criminal Law: Florida's Legal Lotteries, 9 U. 
Fla. L. Rev. 93 (1956). 
6. Gambling Impact on New Orleans, supra 
note 5, at 46-47. For a paralleJ analysis of 
Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
these costs, see Increased Crime and Lega/iz-
ing Gambling, supra note 2, at 547-548. 
7. Politzer, Morrow, & Leavey, supra note 2, at 
18-20. For parallel analyses of these costs, 
see John W. Kindt, The Economic Impacts of 
Legalized Gambling Activities, 43 Drake L. 
Rev. 51, 89-93 at Table 3, n.282 (1994) 
[hereinafter Economic Impacts]; Increased 
Crime and Legalizing Gambling, supra note 2, 
at 550. 
8. Politzer, Morrow, & Leavey, supra note 2, at 
9, 18-20. For parallel analyses of these costs, 
see Economic Impacts, supra note 7, at 89-93 
at Table 3, n.283; Increased Crime and Legal-
izing Gambling, supra note 2, at 550. For 
uniformity, the number of $21000 per year is 
reduced to $2100 per pathological gambler to 
reflect a 10% incarceration rate. 
9. To provide 'before' and 'after' estimates of 
the impact of pervasive legalized gambling 
activities, this cost was extrapolated from 
lllinois analyses which were subjected to in-
depth academic and public scrutiny. See, e.g., 
Interview with Ill. Gov. James Edgar, on 
Crossfue, Cable News Network, Jan. 6,1993. 
For a parallel analysis of this cost, see In-
creased Crime and Legalizing Gambling, 
supra note 2, at 546-547. 
10. NJ. Comm. on Compulsive Gambling, Leg-
islative Guide For Responsible Gaming In 
Your State, at 2 (Jan. 25, 1997). 
11. Economic Impacts, supra note 7, at 94 n.285 
(referencing Dr. Valerie Lorenz' 1992 esti-
mates of $25000 per year for young prisoners 
and $50000 per year for older prisoners with 
:medical costs). Crim. Justice Inst., The Cor-
rections Yearbook, 1997 75 (cds. Camille Gra-
ham Camp & George M. Camp) (365 days 
multiplied by the healthcare 'average daily 
cost per confmed inmate in 1996' of $54.25 
equals $19801) [bereina.fter Corrections Year-
book, 1997}. 
12. Corrections Yearbook, 1997, supra note 11, 
at 223 (365 days multiplied by the 'overall 
average cost per prisoner per day' of $55.41 
equals $2(224). 
FootDotes for Table AlO 
1. It is significant that for the first time in 
decades the 1997 study by Professor Howard 
Shaffer attempted to redefme the American 
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Psychiatric Association's term 'pathological 
gambling' (or addicted gambling) as 'level 3 
gambling' and 'problem gambling' as 'level 2 
gambling'. Critics of the ShatTer meta-analysis 
noted that the analysis was entirely funded by 
a $140000 grant from the gambling industry 
to reanalyze the 120-152 existing studies doc-
umenting the prevalence of pathological gam-
blers and problem. gamblers. The 'meta-
analysis' resulted in: (1) new PR-conscious 
terms such as 'level 3 rates of gambling', (2) an 
attempt to redefme the 0.77% baseline for 
pathological gambling established by the 1916 
National Commission on Gambling in Amer-
ica at 0.84% (which critics opined could oper-
ate to the PR benefit of the gambling 
industry), and (3) omission of the most impor-
tant numbers of the 120-152 existing preva-
lence studies - specifically the rates of 
pathological gamblers and problem. gamblers. 
See, e.g., Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medi-
cal School, Estimating the Prevalence of Dis-
ordered Gambling Behavior in the United 
States and Canada: A Meta--analysis, at 51 
(Table 16) and 101 (App. 2) (Howard J. Shaf-
fer, Matthew N. Hall, &: Joni Vander Bilt, 
Dec. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Harvard Addic-
tions Meta-analysisJ; see Press Release of Har-
vard Medical Sch., 'Harvard Medical School 
Researchers Map Prevalence of Gambling 
Disorders in North America', Dec. 4, 1991 
(From 0.84%, 'the prevalenc:e rate [for patho-
logical gambling] for 1994-1991 grew to 1.29 
percent of the adult population'.). Compare 
U.S. Comm'n on the Rev. of a Nat'l Pol'y 
Toward Gambling. Gambling in America 13 
(U.S. Gov't Printing Off. 1916), with Harvard 
Addictions Meta-analysis, infra at 43, Table 
13. 
FootDotes f. Table All 
1. Nat'1 Tech. Information Serv., U.S. Dep't 
Com., 1992 Worldwide Survey Of Substance 
Abuse And Health Behaviors Among Military 
Personnel 12-14 to 12-30 (hereinafter Mili-
tary Personne1]. 
2. U.S. Dep't Defense (1991). In 1991. U.S. mili-
tary personnel totaled 2 million but this force 
strength was subject to drawdown. See, e.g., 
Military Personnel, supra note 1, at 12-14 to 
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12-20. By 1996-1991, U.S. military personnel 
numbered I.S million. U.S. Dep't Defense 
(1991). To simplify comparisons between 
years, a 1991 base population of 1.5 million is 
utilized. 
3. Div. on Addictions, Harvard Medical Sch., 
Estimating the Prevalence of Disordered Gam-
bling Behavior in the United States and 
Canada: A Meta-analysis, at 43, Table 13 
(Howard J. Shaffer, Matthew N. Hall, &: JoDi 
Vander Bilt, Dec. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Har-
vard Addictions Meta-analysis]; see Press Re-
lease of Harvard Medical Sch., 'Harvard 
Medical School Researchers Map Prevalence 
of Gambling Disorders in North America', 
Dec. 4, 1991 (From 0.84"10, 'the prevalence rate 
[for pathological gamblers] for 1994-1991 
grew to 1.29 percent of the adult population'.). 
Since the Harvard Addictions Meta-analysis 
did not include the calculations for essential 
elements, some reasonable estimates and con-
clusions consistent with the data need to be 
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